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ABSTRACT 
 
Open sources contain publicly available information at a low cost. The amount 
of open sources information an individual has access to has increased dramatically in 
the 21st century. The question is how to evaluate these diversified open sources in 
producing intelligence- supporting the policymakers in making their decisions by 
providing them with the necessary information. To retrieve the actionable intelligence 
from huge amounts of open sources information, and to do source validation are big 
challenges. 
In this study, an open sources intelligence (OSINT) integrated intelligence 
model is proposed, explained and compared with the traditional intelligence model. The 
contemporary intelligence analyst and his/her OSINT making process is explained. A 
case study of OSINT is prepared, analyzed and the analysis results are given. 
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ÖZ 
 
Açık kaynaklar herkese açık, düşük bir maliyetle elde edilebilecek bilgi içerir. 
Bir kişinin erişebileceği açık kaynak bilgisinin miktarı 21. yüzyılda çok büyük bir 
oranda artmıştır. Temel soru bu çok çeşitli açık kaynakların, istihbarat -karar verenlerin 
karar verme sürecinde gerekli bilgi ile desteklenmesi- üretmede nasıl değerlendirilmesi 
gerektiğidir. Çok büyük miktardaki açık kaynak bilgisinden işe yarar istihbaratın elde 
edilmesi ve bu bilgi üzerinde kaynak doğrulaması yapılması temel problemler olarak 
göze çarpmaktadır. 
Bu çalışmada açık kaynak istihbaratı ile bütünleştirilmiş bir istihbarat modeli 
önerilmekte, açıklanmakta ve geleneksel istihbarat modeli ile karşılaştırılmaktadır. 
Çağdaş istihbarat analisti ve analistin açık kaynak istihbaratı yapma süreci de 
açıklanmaktadır. Bir açık kaynak istihbaratı durum incelemesi analizi ve analiz 
sonuçlarının tartışılması da ayrıca sunulmaktadır. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION TO INTELLIGENCE 
 
1.1 Basic Definitions 
 
Intelligence is one of the government functions that supports the policymakers in 
making their decisions by providing them with the necessary information. The product 
produced by intelligence analysts in order to fulfill the policymaker demands is also 
named as intelligence. It is so crucial that what intelligence means for a government is 
the same as what food means for an organism. Without it, the government couldn’t 
survive.  
Intelligence is of two kind: continuous and discrete.  
In the continuous intelligence case, the policymakers define the main concern 
areas for the government and demand steady information flow from the intelligence 
analysts regarding these areas. In forming the steady information flow; the intelligence 
analysts, in order to provide useful intelligence should be informed about the priorities 
and the attitudes of the government in the defined concern areas.  
Discrete intelligence, on the other hand, is requested by the policymakers for a 
specific decision at a specific time and usually puts a time pressure upon the intelligence 
analysts’ shoulders. Continuous intelligence whether delivered or not forms the 
background for the discrete intelligence. 
Intelligence activities coordinated by the government form a recurring process 
which runs in both managerial and executive levels. The representatives of these levels 
are the policymakers and the intelligence analysts respectively.  
The intelligence process is stimulated by the question or request of the 
policymaker. Whenever the request arrives to the intelligence analyst, the analyst 
comprehends the request, checks the resource capabilities of the agency and exploits 
some of the resources for the problem at hand. (The policymakers determine the total 
intelligence budget and its allocation over the intelligence issues thus do the resource 
management.) The analysis begins as soon as the analyst gets the request. Most of the 
time, the information repository in the agency is not sufficient to respond the 
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policymakers’ requests so the intelligence analyst needs to collect more information via 
the various collection disciplines. The collection disciplines are the means by which one 
gets access to the information.  
The basic groups of collection disciplines are the following: 
 
• Technical collection disciplines. 
- Signals Intelligence-SIGINT. 
- Imagery-IMINT. 
- Measurement and Signature Intelligence-MASINT. 
• Human Intelligence-HUMINT. 
• Open Sources-OSINT. 
 
The technical collection disciplines capture the information in transmission, are 
leaded by technological developments, and require special training and expertise for the 
personnel. 
 
1.1.1 SIGINT 
 
SIGINT is an extremely valuable capability, allowing the observation of activity 
through the content and pattern of signals and giving insights into intentions. SIGINT 
actually comprises several different types of intercepts. The term is often used to refer 
to the interception of communications between two parties, which is also known as 
communications intelligence (COMINT). SIGINT can also refer to the pickup of data 
relayed by weapons during tests, which is sometimes called telemetry intelligence 
(TELINT). Finally, SIGINT can refer to the pickup of electronic emissions from 
modern weapons and tracking systems, which are useful means of gauging their 
capabilities, such as range and frequencies on which systems operate. This is sometimes 
referred to as electronic intelligence (ELINT).  
 
1.1.2 IMINT 
 
Imagery intelligence refers to the production of images via airplanes, imagery 
satellites, radars etc. The utility of imagery is dependent on the size and the resolution 
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of the images. High resolutions are needed for precision-targeting purposes. IMINT is 
most often associated with indications and warning, and military operations. 
 
1.1.3 MASINT 
 
MASINT images are built by reflections from several bands across the spectrum 
of light, some visible, some invisible. It will become increasingly important in 
providing unique scientific or highly technical information contributions to the 
intelligence community. It can provide specific weapon identifications, chemical 
compositions and material content and a potential adversary's capability to employ 
weapons.1
Technical collection disciplines need common standards and protocols for the 
best utilization in an electronic base. 
 
1.1.4 HUMINT 
 
Human intelligence activities are what most people think about when they hear 
the word "intelligence". Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collectors (spies) are people 
carrying out covert action. HUMINT is needed as a major means of getting access to 
plans and intentions. 
 
1.1.5 OSINT 
 
Means obtaining intelligence from publicly available sources that are legally and 
ethically accessed and are available at low cost. OSINT is gaining greater emphasis 
since the number of exploitable open sources has increased after the Cold War and the 
intelligence products started to be based mostly on open sources thus providing efficient 
use of the resource capabilities of the intelligence community. 
 
The collection disciplines, the capabilities, and their development are managed 
also by the policymakers. The exploitation of them for the given problem is determined 
by the intelligence analysts. The availability, the cost, and the reliability of the 
1 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence From Secrets to Policy (USA: CQ Press, 2000) 61-66. 
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collection means vary so the intelligence analyst should make a balance in their usage, 
collect from as many sources as possible, producing an all-source intelligence product. 
In the collection phase, the intelligence analyst should collect as much as he/she 
can evaluate. The collected materials become useful when they are read, sorted, 
classified and placed in the repository of the intelligence agency. Otherwise the 
collection resources are wasted. Before adding new information to the repository or 
doing an update, the analyst should make source validation by comparing the 
information from the different collection means.  
All along the intelligence process, the intelligence analyst plays an active role, 
all the time communicating with the policymakers at the top and the infrastructure 
support personnel at the bottom. He/she executes the intelligence process and the 
success of the product-intelligence is determined by his/her analytical skills, experience, 
and expertise. The intelligence analyst produces the intelligence with his/her 
understanding, using his/her knowledge and wisdom and thus adds value to the 
information converting it into intelligence. 
The intelligence product is presented to the intelligence customer-the 
policymaker. The policymaker evaluates the submitted intelligence and with his/her 
feedback to the intelligence analyst the intelligence process continues.  
The key activities in the intelligence process can be listed as resource allocation, 
collection, analysis, and evaluation. All of these key activities except analysis should be 
dealt with by both the policymaker and the intelligence analyst. Thus there is a need for 
a transparency between the managerial and executive levels.  
Analysis is the job of the intelligence analyst and prevails all along the process. 
The policymaker is the consumer of the intelligence effort and has a right to interrogate 
the intelligence product. For an intelligence product, an intelligence analyst should state 
the points where his/her estimations begin and end versus the collected material, the 
collection means, the source validation efforts. Thus the policymaker should be given a 
chance to make his/her own analysis with the given inputs executing the intelligence 
process on his/her own.  
As a result, a good intelligence product is2: 
 
• Timely, 
2 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence From Secrets to Policy (USA: CQ Press, 2000) 93-94. 
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• Tailored: Responsive to the policymaker’s request, 
• Digestible: Brief, in ideal size for policymaker to read, 
• Objective: Not biased by the policy views of the intelligence analyst, 
• Clear regarding the known and the unknown: States the points of 
assumption, interpretation, estimation. 
 
1.2 The Intelligence Process 
 
From the old times to these days, a lot of states and empires have been abolished 
and new ones have emerged. There have always been conflicts, controversies and wars 
on Earth and always will. The key question is that in this never ending competition what 
states will be winners, what principles and strategies will be useful, how to guide the 
changes on Earth, is it enough to preserve the status quo?  
Every government tries to find and shape its own route and support this route 
with the principles and strategies. A government cannot be successful in its goal unless 
it communicates with the other governments, it builds up the necessary relations. 
Isolation cannot be a solution in the global environment in the 21st century. A 
government should protect its integrity and the way of protection is to monitor the 
internal and external information flows and make interpretations and reach decisions, 
executing an intelligence process.  
A government establishes an intelligence organization for coordinating the 
intelligence activities. The intelligence activities comprise a theoretical and an 
operational part. These two parts complement each other. The theoretical activities in 
the intelligence process are:  
 
• Requirements Definition. 
• Resource Allocation. 
• Collection. 
• Analysis. 
• Production. 
• Evaluation. 
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Counterintelligence and covert action form the operational part. 
Counterintelligence and covert action represent defensive and offensive operations 
respectively. 
 
1.2.1 Counterintelligence 
 
The counterintelligence function involves protecting the country, as well as 
intelligence agencies, from the activities of foreign intelligence services. 
Counterintelligence is an integral part of the entire intelligence process. All 
agencies that undertake intelligence collection, whether through human or technical 
means, must be constantly on guard that what they are collecting is genuine. This 
requires continuous evaluation of their sources as well as the information gathered from 
them.3
Information verification and source validation have become more problematic 
with extensive use of open sources in collection. Although the amount of information 
available via open sources has increased dramatically, the usable part has remained the 
same.  
Information verification and source validation activities are performed along the 
collection and analysis phases of the intelligence process. During the collection phase, 
the co-utilization of various collection disciplines provides a verification mechanism 
and the analysis helps to find the anomalies in the collected material. Thus, 
counterintelligence activities go in parallel with the collection and analysis work of the 
intelligence process. 
 
1.2.2 Covert Action 
 
Covert actions (as distinguished from the covert collection of information) are 
used to influence political, military, or economic conditions or situations abroad, where 
3 “Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence,” Commission on the Roles and 
Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, 1996, 
<http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/dpos/epubs/int/index.html>. 
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it is intended that the role of the government will not be apparent or acknowledged 
publicly. 4
The use of such operations is an outgrowth of policymakers’ need for so-called 
“quiet” and “middle” options (that is, tools that are more powerful than diplomacy but 
short of using military forces) to counter dangerous adversaries.5
Covert actions are proactive measures performed by the intelligence 
organization and are offensive. Offensive actions in nature violate the moral rules and in 
democratic governments need appropriate reasoning, proof for public approval.  
There are two legitimate reasons for carrying out an operation covertly rather 
than overtly. One is when open knowledge of responsibility would make an operation 
infeasible. The other reason for carrying out an operation covertly is implicit, but just as 
important: to avoid retaliation or control escalation. 6
When an intelligence organization includes covert action to its intelligence 
cycle, it should take into consideration: 
 
• The strategies to keep the secrecy of the operation, 
• If the secrecy couldn’t have been kept, the rules for deniability, 
• If the deniability fails, the ways to convince public of the validity of the 
operation performed. 
 
The range of covert action options can be summarized as follows: 
 
• Paramilitary Operations 
Providing military support with a foreign group or country in order to 
support the national interests in the region of that group or country. 
• Propaganda 
Utilization of media to construct an image or opinion that is in support of the 
foreign policy. 
 
4 “Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence,” Commission on the Roles and 
Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, 1996, 
<http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/dpos/epubs/int/index.html>. 
5 Bruce D. Berkowitz, Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth Intelligence in the Information Age (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2000) 124-129. 
6 ibid 129-130. 
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• Political and Economic Influence Operations 
Trying to change the political and economic conditions abroad in support of 
the foreign policy. 
• Assassination 
The killing of a prominent, hostile person by surprise attack for political 
reasons. 
• Coups 
Advanced versions of political influence operations which cause the collapse 
of the existing government by the opposition forces. 
• Information Warfare 
 
The intelligence process can be depicted as an information flow occuring in the 
different analytical levels of a target organization:7 (Figure 1.1) 
 
7 “IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century,” 1996, U.S. Congress House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence,  
<http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/intel/ic21/ic21_toc.html>. 
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Chapter 2 
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
 
2.1 Definition 
 
Analysis is defined as  
 
• The separation of an intellectual or material whole into its constituent parts 
for individual study. 
• The study of such constituent parts and their interrelationships in making up 
a whole. 
• A spoken or written presentation of such study.8 
 
An analysis work starts with a goal in mind. As for intelligence analysis, the 
government strategy, the policy goal in the given issue is the driving factor of the 
analysis. Intelligence analysis is division of an intelligence issue into its small parts and 
the realization of the relationships between these small parts and the issue itself, the 
cause and effect links. In short, it is the effort of extracting the nature of intelligence 
issue.  
The natural response to the policymakers as a result of their intelligence requests 
is the report prepared by the intelligence analysts. In preparing a report, intelligence 
analysts do analysis on the collected material and this analysis should add value to the 
collected material. 
The consumers of the reports prepared by the intelligence analysts are the 
policymakers and they should see the contribution of the intelligence analysts to the 
intelligence product and appreciate the added value to the collected material provided 
by intelligence analysts. 
Intelligence analysts are the producers of intelligence, the brain team of the 
intelligence process. Within the intelligence organization hierarchy and in different 
8 The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 2000, 
<http://www.bartleby.com/61/94/A0279400.html, Fourth Edition>. 
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departments, there are intelligence analysts with different backgrounds, different 
expertise fields, different analytical skills and experiences.  
The mission of the intelligence analysts is all the time to add value to the 
collection output. It’s a very difficult mission because in the international dynamic 
environment, the main concern-mission areas of the intelligence tend to have new 
requirements for analysis. In addition to the changes that have taken place in the 
requirements for analysis in traditional missions, the intelligence community is faced 
with some requirements for analysis that are almost entirely new.9
The causes of this great change in the intelligence work can be stated as follows: 
 
• With the collapse of the walls between the countries, the blocks, market 
economies have become dominant in the world and economic dependencies 
have become more important. A global economic awareness has arisen. 
• Knowledge has become the most important asset in the world, 
communication facilities increased, computer networks have been 
constructed and computer-based systems have been common. However, 
these developments have not become homogeneously on Earth. The North 
America and Europe have been the leaders. The gap between the developed, 
developing and under-developed countries has expanded, the diversities have 
increased. 
• The increased diversities, the welfare differences on Earth have made the 
ideological movements stronger. 
• The new technological developments, the relatively inexpensive ways of 
communication, travel have made the individual more capable to mobilize 
and the developments in information technology have created a new type of 
warfare, information warfare-the activities undertaken by governments, 
groups, or individuals to gain electronic access to information systems in 
other countries either for the purpose of obtaining the data in such systems, 
manipulating or fabricating the data, or perhaps even bringing the systems 
down, as well as activities undertaken to protect against such activities10, the  
9 Bruce D. Berkowitz, Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth Intelligence in the Information Age (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2000) 111. 
10 “Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence,” Commission on the Roles and 
Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, 1996, 
<http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/dpos/epubs/int/index.html>. 
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developments in medicine and medical informatics have provided the new 
ways of constructing weapons (chemical and biological) in addition to 
nuclear ones. 
• Media has become a very effective power and countries that control the main 
communication channels have manipulated media to support their interests. 
• One problem for example, a disease in any part of the world raised a global 
concern because of its spreadability. 
• Threat types have become much more variant. 
• The public consciousness has raised, democracies have increased, the 
governments started to be strongly interrogated by the public and the number 
of exploitable open sources have increased. 
 
Therefore, in our era, 
 
• new approaches to analysis should be developed, 
• intelligence analysts’ qualifications should be redefined, 
• intelligence analysis missions should be redefined. 
 
2.2 Contemporary Intelligence Analysis & Analyst 
 
Contemporary intelligence analysis differs from the old one in some ways.  
In the first place, there has always been an issue classification in the intelligence 
community and a hierarchical organization of intelligence analysts. When the 
policymaker determines an intelligence issue to be analyzed, he/she gives the job to the 
intelligence analyst responsible for that issue and a top-down analysis process begins. In 
the top-down analysis, the analysis job is separated into sub-tasks and every sub-task is 
accomplished by the intelligence analyst who is responsible for that sub-category. At 
the end of the process, the analysis tasks are joined from the bottom to the top to form 
the issue analysis product. In the past, intelligence organization was not capable to store 
all the documents from the bottom to the top and almost in every case the top-down 
analysis should occur repeating itself many times. Today, thanks to the computerized 
systems, due to the huge storage capabilities and short data access times, the 
intelligence analyst responsible for the given analysis issue can apply to the documents 
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previously produced by the sub-level intelligence analysts to have the background 
information, he/she contacts the sub-level intelligence analyst when necessary and the 
intelligence analysis job can be performed in a relatively short time thus utilizing less 
resources. However, this advantage can be gained only if the intelligence analysts are 
computer literate, at ease using the electronic search facilities. 
Electronic open sources should be made reachable directly by policymakers 
giving the policymaker the chance for making his/her own intelligence analysis on the 
given intelligence issue and for verification purposes also. They must be computer 
literate as well. 
Secondly, the available open sources and services outside the intelligence 
community have dramatically increased and intelligence analysts should find a way to 
provide the information flow from these open sources and services to the intelligence 
organization. Thus in the contemporary situation open sources should be exploited as 
much as possible.  
Additionally; today, intelligence issues have become multi-dimensional, closely 
related to the other intelligence issues. Thus, in evaluating an intelligence issue, one 
should make the evaluation taking into consideration as much other issues as possible. 
For a given issue, there should be a quite large database of related intelligence issues. In 
order to effectively handle this multi-issue problem; 
 
• Horizontal (issue to issue) information flow should be strongly supported, 
• Better-qualified intelligence analysts should exist. (Have more than one 
expertise field.) 
 
In our international dynamic environment the intelligence analysts must be able 
to sense the environment, the policymaker needs and keep track of the changes. The 
relationship between the intelligence analysts and the policymakers should be much 
closer. The required qualifications for an intelligence analyst are listed below:  
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2.2.1 Job Qualifications of an IntelligenceAnalyst 
 
Has wisdom 
Knowledge of: History, geography, international relations, law, mathematics, 
geometry, languages, information technology, psychology, communication, 
political science, religion, forensics. 
Ability to: speak languages, foresee, use emotional intelligence11, make 
inferences, deductions, inductions (analytical thinking). 
Education: (university) information technology, international relations, law, 
political science 
Useful leisure time activities: Puzzle making, chess, speed reading 
 
The countries define their intelligence missions in order to provide the 
intelligence analysts with the purpose they need in their analysis work. The intelligence 
missions are common all over the world. The identification of them and the 
accomplishment methods make the distinction. 
Intelligence missions can be summarized as follows: 
 
• Support to Military Operations 
Military power is a guarantee for a country and is used when a conflict exists 
and cannot be solved by the diplomatic practices. (A high-intensity conflict that 
threatens the main building blocks of a particular government.) Military 
operations need detailed strategic and tactical planning and intelligence support 
helps to follow the strategic plan. Through the intelligence services, a military 
power monitors the battlefield, the opponents etc. The arrival of the obtained 
intelligence to the target bodies in a timely fashion with its integrity increases 
the possibility of success. 
• Political Intelligence 
In order to keep the status quo or change it to the advantage of the government, a 
government should monitor world politics, make future predictions and take 
11 Comprised of personal intelligence skills such as self-conscience, managing the state of mind 
(character), self-motivation, empathy and management of relationships. (Daniel Goleman) 
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appropriate measures to influence events, happenings to its benefit. (Covert 
action)  
Making future predictions for different political regimes are also very different. 
Political developments in authoritarian states are driven by a relatively small 
circle of leaders, most of whom usually have similar backgrounds. Democracies 
often have more complex internal politics. Rapidly changing coalitions and 
shifts in popular opinion can be difficult to predict. 12 In addition to this, it’s 
difficult to track counter-regime groups, terrorists etc. 
• Economic Intelligence 
Economic power is the indicator of all the other power bases and is the 
determining factor of having a dominant foreign policy execution. Due to open 
market economies, import-export relationships, all the economies are tied 
together and dependent on each other. Therefore, there is a need to keep a global 
economic balance. To accomplish this, economic intelligence is required. Also 
intelligence organizations should detect industrial espionage, corrupt or illegal 
practices in international trade, and critical technologies with military 
applications.13
• Support to Monitoring of Treaties and Other Agreements 
Countries sign international treaties and accept agreements to control the 
adversaries’ behavior by obeyed rules or protect itself from the potential 
enemies and have some allies. Once an agreement has been reached, there 
should be a control mechanism that checks whether any side is acting opposed to 
the accepted rules. In some cases, one contractor does not break the accepted 
rules but tries to make a deception. Thus intelligence analysis is needed for 
monitoring the treaties and agreements. Nowadays, the international treaties and 
agreements are the bodies that act in favor of the stronger contractors unlike the 
treaties between the two poles in the Cold War Era. 
• Collecting and Analyzing Environmental Information 
Environmental threats and failures in any part of the world may result in similar 
environmental situations in other parts and also can have political and economic  
12 Bruce D. Berkowitz, Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth Intelligence in the Information Age (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2000) 106. 
13 ibid 111. 
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consequences that affect the other countries as well. As a result, analysis of the 
environmental information emerges as a new intelligence mission. 
• Collecting and Analyzing Information on World Health Problems 
Intelligence reports should be prepared about world health problems so that 
some preventive measures can be constructed against the diseases and the spread 
of the diseases can be blocked. 
• Collecting Information about Information Warfare 
Information warfare has become a very serious threat in the 21st century. 
Intelligence analysis is required for measuring the dependency of the country to 
the computerized systems, identifying the vulnerable points of the infrastructure, 
applying security mechanisms and implementing the counter activities when 
necessary. 
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Chapter 3 
OPEN SOURCES INTELLIGENCE 
 
3.1 Open Sources Intelligence and Information Society 
 
Open sources intelligence has started being used as an intelligence term with the 
advent of information technologies. Information technologies and huge communication 
facilities have facilitated the possibility of one individual/one organization to reach 
information; the number of open sources and services available to any consumer has 
dramatically increased.  
In order to understand open sources intelligence and the importance of it in the 
21st century, it is useful to look at the information creation, use and transfer ways in the 
past and present.  
The nations have gone mainly through three periods and each period represents a 
different kind of society. The societies can be stated as agrarian society, industrial 
society, and information society.  
In the agrarian society, the main possession was land and people used to 
cultivate it. Thus, people provided the main source of energy. Hand-made products were 
common, the production was in limited numbers and varieties. The knowledge had been 
created by individual experience spending years of time with the masters. There has 
been restricted distribution of knowledge mainly for two reasons: 
 
• The knowledge masters were reluctant to transfer their knowledge 
immediately, the knowledge retrieval was a very long process.  
• The only way of knowledge transfer was through face-to-face 
communication. Because of restricted travel opportunities, people used to 
live in restricted environments. The knowledge transfer was limited with the 
environment. 
 
This restricted distribution of knowledge blocked social and technological 
progress in the agrarian society. 
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The agrarian society was followed by the industrial society. The industrial 
society introduced the steam power and the power of electricity to the life. These new 
forms of energy had enabled the people to arrive in distant locations in shorter times at a 
lower cost; the big cities had been formed, the nations had founded states, mass 
production of various goods had been started and public infrastructures had been 
constructed. As a result of the new sources of power, a lot of people had lost their jobs 
that depended on human labor. With these optimized conditions, the concept of science 
was born. In the industrial society science created knowledge and education distributed 
it. Two different groups appeared as scientists and educators. Science enabled the 
scientists to transform their knowledge into the written material and with the invent of 
the printing house these materials had been reproduced and the books had been the main 
materials of education.  
As the last period, the information society is characterised by the computers and 
telecommunications. With the information revolution, the information systems have 
started to be based on computers, the communication facilities have dramatically 
increased, the national boundaries have started to disappear, the globalization appeared 
as a new trend, global corporations have been founded, economic dependencies have 
increased. Science has continued to create knowledge; education opportunities have 
been greatly improved. Distant education has been an alternative, electronic documents 
and software started to contest with the printed material in education. Internet 
dominated the education world. 
Most importantly, computers deprived humans of their monopoly on 
intelligence. Computers are incomparable in power for performing activities that are 
deterministic and are explicitly defined. However, they do not have decision-making 
skills; lack the ability to create knowledge. Therefore, creativity alone defines an 
individual’s place in the information society. 14
The information society has introduced the openness concept to the world. Open 
sources and services have been available with little cost. Thus, the intelligence analysts 
lost their role as the main intelligence collectors because the sources and services 
reaching the policymakers surpassed that of the intelligence analysts. Effective and 
efficient evaluation of open sources have become important, the added-value introduced 
14 Wojciech Cellary, “The profession - The profession's role in the global information society,” IEEE 
Computer 36.9 (Sept. 2003). 
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to the collected material defines the intelligence analysts’ place in the new intelligence 
organization and the intelligence analysts have required a new role as the manager of 
the all-source collection process. 
 
3.2 Definitions 
 
After creating knowledge, people transform it into different forms in order to 
ease the knowledge use and transfer. The forms of knowledge are: 15
 
• Hard copy – on paper, the medium most people are used to, and poor for 
quick search and retrieval purposes. 
• Microfiche - the medium used in the patent and archival worlds. 
• Electronic form and software - relatively low cost and very suitable for 
diverse storage and retrieval requirements. It’s the principal medium of the 
information age. 
• Human knowledge – the main source which provides real-time access to the 
other mediums--the human expert responsive to tasking can rapidly collect, 
process, and disseminate essential information from the other mediums, on 
demand. 
 
Knowledge creation is a very resource-consuming task and done by humans as 
an individual or a group. The people have different motivations for creating knowledge. 
Self-satisfaction, money, serving the society; are among them. If the knowledge request 
comes from the external bodies such as the intelligence organization, knowledge 
creation work can be described as dependent. Academicians generally produce the 
independent knowledge. 
The access to the knowledge can be made restricted in order to ensure that it is 
transferred to only those who have paid for it and/or prevent misuse and/or abuse of it. 
“Need to know” rule is commonly used to define the access rights. Open and closed 
accesses are the two ends of the access spectrum. 
15 Robert D. Steele, “Open Source Intelligence: Professional Handbook 1.0,” Proceedings of the Fifth 
International Symposium on Global Security & Global Competitiveness Open Source Solutions Sept. 
1996, Appendix C 8-9. 
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The use and transfer of the knowledge require some expenses to be paid. In the 
knowledge world as well "you get what you pay for". 
The credibility, reliability, and origin of the knowledge are also concerns for the 
knowledge retrievers. If there is enough information of these concerns then the 
knowledge source can be described as known. Otherwise it remains as unknown. 
The organization of knowledge strongly affects its use. Well-organized, 
structured knowledge has more service than the unstructured one. 
Ethical and legal concerns, international obligations have also effect on 
knowledge use and transfer. The knowledge retrieval methods are between least 
intrusive to peoples’ freedom and privacy and highly intrusive ones. 
The risks taken to get and use knowledge, and the nature of the channels used 
(overt/covert) for having the knowledge are very important concerns of the knowledge 
world as well. 
Thus, the above stated the dimensions of the knowledge sources could be 
summarized as below: 
 
• open to closed access, 
• cheap to expensive, 
• unknown to known, 
• independent to dependent, 
• unstructured to structured, 
• low risk to high risk, 
• least intrusive to highly intrusive, 
• overt to covert.16 
 
By taking into consideration the above dimensions, information is grouped into 
five major categories: (Figure 3.1) 
 
16 Jason L. Brown, “Open Source Information and the Intelligence Based Decision Model,” Optimising 
Open Source Information Conference 7-8 Oct. 1998, 9-10. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top Secret info: 
spying, very much risky in terms of human life 
Classified info: 
very high cost, spying, satellites 
Closed Proprietary info: 
high cost, espionage starts, human life risk 
Open Proprietary info: 
moderate cost for reverse engineering 
***Open Sources info:*** 
low cost: internet 
 
 
Figure 3.1 The information pyramid representing the five information categories. 
 
● Open Sources Information (OSI) is legally and ethically available, at a low 
cost. It contributes the understanding of the problem, tells the current 
situation and the context. Evaluation of the OSI in the first place for the 
intelligence collection provides a good background and helps the effective 
and efficient tasking of the other, more difficult collection disciplines saving 
much of the resources. 
● Open Proprietary Information, can be legally and ethically obtained, but 
requires a moderate cost to commission reverse engineering studies to 
extract the information from the product. This is a good alternative to riskier 
and higher cost espionage intended to steal the information from within the 
target organization. Examples: buying a French missile to study the missile 
guidance software and hardware; buying Russian imagery to calculate their 
overhead technical capabilities.  
● Closed Proprietary Information is only available from within the secure areas 
of the target organization, and requires espionage, at high cost, to obtain. 
Examples: stealing source code for major computer applications; stealing 
designs for delicate machinery used to create scientific & technical 
instruments.  
 21
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● Classified information, collected by spies and satellites, is very expensive, 
and in the cast of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), often very risky. It does, 
however, have a very special value to the all-source analyst as its accuracy 
and reliability is high--this is especially the case with Signals Intelligence 
(SIGINT) products.  
● Top Secret Information is the peek point of the information pyramid. It 
represents the most reliable and expensive information obtained through the 
riskiest, the most intrusive, and covert ways.17 
 
The official Open Source definition comes from the US Director of Central 
Intelligence Directive dated 1 March 1994 as follows: 
“Open source information is publicly available information, including official 
yet unclassified information of limited public distribution or access. Open source 
information also includes any information used in an unclassified context without 
compromising a country’s national security or intelligence sources and methods. If the 
information is not publicly available, certain legal requirements relating to acquisition, 
retention, and dissemination may apply.” 18
Open sources intelligence covers the open sources information. 
Open sources intelligence has been introduced as a separate collection discipline 
and in producing an intelligence product; it should be the first discipline to exploit for 
providing the baseline. Actually, at the collection step, the information gathered from 
the open sources and services is not the intelligence yet, it is open sources information 
that has been clipped from various sources, organized and distilled but still generic, not 
responsive to the specific policymaker requests. 
Open sources information is transformed into open sources intelligence by 
means of the analysis work, without analysis it is impossible to describe it as 
intelligence that is responsive to the policy-maker requests. In making the analysis, in 
order to present a reliable, an accurate, and a tailored product, the intelligence analysts 
should do source validation. After the source validation, open sources intelligence 
17 Robert D. Steele, “Open Source Intelligence: Professional Handbook 1.0,” Proceedings of the Fifth 
International Symposium on Global Security & Global Competitiveness Open Source Solutions Sept. 
1996, Chapter 2 2-3. 
18 “November 1995 - OS-Pro List Monthly Topic,” Open Source Quarterly 1.1 (1995), 
<http://www.osint.org/osq/v1n1/defining.htm>. 
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becomes validated open sources intelligence. One important thing here is that although 
it is validated open sources intelligence, the intelligence analysts utilize all kinds of 
sources and services not only the open ones in the validation task. 
Policymakers’ job requires making the best future predictions in order to direct 
the policy effectively. Best future predictions are the natural consequences of the good 
intelligence products, good intelligence jobs. An intelligence job tries to reveal the 
invisible part of an issue by the help of the visible, to find the unknown by means of the 
known things. Working on the visible part, going over the known things require a good 
strategy as well. In shaping this strategy, it’s a good starting point to utilize the open 
sources & services for understanding the issue, the problem at hand and thus to 
determine what to collect, from where / whom, and when.  
Low-cost open sources intelligence is the tool for planning and managing the 
utilization of the other expensive collection disciplines and thus the scarce resources. 
Dr. Joseph Nye likens open sources to the outer pieces of the jigsaw puzzle, without 
which you can neither begin nor complete the puzzle. Classified sources, however, were 
essential to fill in the hardest to understand middle of the puzzle, and to complete the 
picture. 
The role of open sources intelligence in the final intelligence product is an 
important measure in evaluating the importance of open sources intelligence in today’s 
intelligence environment. The following figures strengthen the position of open sources 
intelligence in the all-source intelligence work: 
 
At the Central Intelligence Agency, the general rule of thumb is that open source 
data comprises 40% of the final all-source intelligence product.  
Within the Defense Intelligence Agency, the general percentage, according to 
one graduate thesis survey, is 30%.  
In Canada, according to Mr. Ward Elcock, the director of the Canadian Security 
and Intelligence Service, open sources comprise 80% of the final all-source 
product. 19
 
 
19 Robert D. Steele, “Open Source Intelligence: Professional Handbook 1.0,” Proceedings of the Fifth 
International Symposium on Global Security & Global Competitiveness Open Source Solutions Sept. 
1996, Chapter 1 11. 
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3.3 Open Sources 
 
The requested knowledge for a given intelligence problem resides in one of the 
following objects that represent the information continuum (knowledge terrain) in a 
country: 
 
● Schools and Universities, 
● Libraries, 
● Businesses, 
● Private Investigators and Information Brokers, 
● Media, 
● Government, 
● Intelligence Community, 
● Defense. 
 
Today, intelligence analysts have good capabilities in terms of the range of open 
sources. (listed below) 20 The electronic search capabilities have greatly increased the 
speed. The Internet, commercial online services, and limited access electronic databases 
are the main electronic open sources.  
 
● The Internet is the global network of computers and is reachable by 
millions of people around the world and the connection fees are being less. 
The main problem of the free Internet environment is that there is no 
common accepted organization for the information, there is no global index 
and thus there are no efficient and effective search facilities. As a result of 
these poor search facilities, after a search you’re faced with huge amounts of 
information that are impossible to process and exploit. Although it seems to 
be free, all the exclusive information providers are available if you have a 
valid username and password for their systems. They require this in order to 
be certain that the information is not serving the malicious purposes, to form 
the profiles of people using the system, and to ensure that the system is used 
20 Robert D. Steele, “Open Source Intelligence: Professional Handbook 1.0,” Proceedings of the Fifth 
International Symposium on Global Security & Global Competitiveness Open Source Solutions Sept. 
1996, Chapter 2 3-4. 
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by only those who have paid the subscription fees. The reliability of the 
information on the Internet is a big problem as well. 
● Commercial online services are knowledge banks of different kinds of 
issues, are accessible online, and require payment. Some are good for 
academic publications, some are useful in trade publications, others are 
helpful in specialized technical areas etc. Therefore, it’s important to identify 
the right services for the specific issue at hand. 
● Limited access electronic databases are owned by schools and universities, 
libraries, industrial associations and businesses. They are available in the 
boundaries of the target organization thus special contact is necessary for 
reaching the information and identification of these databases require 
experience. In short, overt human contacts are the best means of identifying 
pertinent databases that are not in the public domain but are accessible.  
● Published literature and "grey literature " (limited edition publications) 
represent relatively old material and are hard copy. In general, they are 
published in the native language of the target country and thus analysts 
should overcome the foreign language problem at first. 
● Speeches and briefings are oral and are ways of acquiring the timely 
knowledge. Speakers’ body language helps the evaluation of the information 
very much. The written versions of them can be accessed through the media 
and other organizations.  
● Direct interviews are oral as well and have the same advantages as speeches 
and briefings. More, the analysts are free in asking their key questions and 
guiding the communication but can be costly. 
● Sponsored external research is requested to take the benefit of the private 
expertise and to overcome the foreign language problem. Private 
investigators and information brokers are the people who perform the search 
and identification of the key personalities for the given topic requires 
experience and good human contacts as well. 
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Chapter 4 
OPEN SOURCES INTELLIGENCE VS. 
THE TRADITIONAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL 
 
4.1 The Traditional Intelligence Model 
 
New dynamics in the 21st century have introduced mainly two distinguishing 
influences to the world community as well as the intelligence community. The first one 
is the amount of information exposed and the second one is the time pressure upon the 
action. Open sources intelligence is the new concept introduced for dealing with this 
new situation. It should recommend ways to handle the information flood and to be 
successful in finding the needle in the haystack. Additionally, it should respond just-in-
time. 
The traditional intelligence model was created in a period in which the 
information sources were scarce, the threats monolithic, and the actions, the responses 
not immediate. The exchanges between the intelligence collaborators were relatively 
restricted, linear when it’s compared with today’s huge, diverse communication 
facilities. The intelligence model is bureaucratic in nature. Its construction is based on 
the Max Weber’s Theory of Bureaucracy.  
In his theory of bureaucracy, Max Weber defines an organizational structure to 
maximize the efficiency, calculability, and predictability; and he terms it as 
bureaucratic. Weber identifies three key features of bureaucratic organizations. Firstly, 
bureaucracies have a formal and unambiguous hierarchical structure of power and 
authority. Secondly, bureaucracies have an elaborate, rationally derived and systematic 
division of labor. Thirdly, bureaucracies are governed by a set of general, formal, 
explicit, exhaustive and largely stable rules that are impersonally applied in decision-
making; moreover, all decisions and communications are recorded in permanent files 
and such records are used to refine existing rules and derive new ones. 
The key features of Weberian bureaucracy can be summarized as; 
 
• hierarchy, 
• division of labor, 
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• rigidity of rules. 21 
 
The ability of the intelligence community to absorb the new demands, be 
responsive to the policymaker in a timely manner is the main issue. Some of the other 
issues can be declared as: 
 
• Can a highly stable, static intelligence organization can satisfy the requests 
of today’s and future’s dynamic environment?  
• Does it need to be reorganized or some additions and/or corrections are 
necessary and/or sufficient?  
• What it means to include the open sources intelligence to the intelligence 
cycle? How to make the integration?  
• With the open sources intelligence is it necessary to reevaluate the model? 
 
In stating the above queries, it is assumed that the intelligence community works 
according to the Weberian bureaucracy. Is it exactly that? Are there any flaws in the 
bureaucratic flows? It seems that the intelligence organizations should interrogate this 
point in the first place. 
In the intelligence community, the bureaucratic model manifests itself in two 
central concepts. The first concept is that of the “intelligence cycle”.22 Every 
intelligence product is the result of a cyclic process. The execution of this cyclic process 
is directed by well-established rules. These rules define the phases, the staff in charge in 
each phase, and the missions of the staff. Everything is already planned and static in this 
execution. Each phase has linear relationships with the preceding and the succeeding 
phases. 
The second concept the intelligence community borrows from the classical 
bureaucratic model is the “coordination process”. 23 The coordination process is based 
on the concept that “the intelligence product represents the corporate view of the 
21 Aby Jain, “Using the lens of Max Weber’s Theory of Bureaucracy to examine E-Government 
Research,” Proceedings of the 37th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 2004, 
 2-3. 
22 Bruce D. Berkowitz, Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth Intelligence in the Information Age (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2000) 68. 
23 ibid 70. 
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intelligence organization” and an exhaustive review process should be executed along 
the hierarchy from the bottom to the top before the submission of the final product. 
The issue of whether the intelligence community should express an “individual 
view” or a “corporate view” raises the broader issue of whether coordination improves 
intelligence, and whether organizational consensus is a good indicator of objective truth. 
The traditional model assumes that coordination improves analysis. It assumes higher 
levels of authority are more likely to be correct, and that greater participation by more 
experts and more agencies is more likely to reveal the truth. 24
One of the shortcomings of the bureaucratic model is related to its hierarchical 
structure. In the hierarchical structure the intelligence consumer can communicate only 
the intelligence analysts at the sub-level. The intelligence consumer communicates the 
requirements of the intelligence task only one top analyst and this top analyst 
propagates the requirements to the sub-level analyst and this propagation goes down 
like this. One flaw in this communication is that if the top analyst fails to evaluate the 
correct intelligence requirements, there is no chance for a responsive, tailored 
intelligence product. The other flaw is that linear propagation of the intelligence 
message can cause many misunderstandings and this weakens the possibility of a good 
intelligence product. 
The people at one level in hierarchy have direct relationships with only two 
levels: one sub and one top. This communication model is not satisfying and does not 
make use of today’s great communication facilities. 
Additionally, hierarchies are difficult to manage. The criteria that are to be used 
to promote individuals to the top levels should be well established and fair.  
In the intelligence organization, the colleagues that are at the same level in the 
hierarchy in competition with each other and each one tries to have his/her view 
accepted in the final intelligence product because of his / her ego and / or in order to get 
promoted. If there is no promotion or other kind of reward then there is no stimulating 
factor for people to work. 
In forming the hierarchical structure of an intelligence organization people are 
placed in the hierarchy according to their expertise fields and experiences. Thus, when 
24 Bruce D. Berkowitz, Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth Intelligence in the Information Age (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2000) 95. 
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an intelligence task is defined, the issue experts for the defined task are assigned to the 
work.  
This means that for the intelligence tasks within the same issue, the same people 
work and coordinate the final intelligence product. This highly static grouping of people 
for the specific issues violates the creativity and is not suitable for serving against multi-
player threats. 
 
4.2 OSINT Integrated Intelligence Model 
 
In constructing an intelligence product, open sources intelligence are 
complemented with the other classified, more specialized capabilities. In this 
integration, some key questions are: 
 
• The open sources exploitation facilities should be distributed evenly along 
the hierarchy?  
• Which individuals in hierarchy can decide to task the classified, more 
specialized capabilities after evaluating the open source product?  
 
The inclusion of the OSINT to the traditional intelligence model does not 
change its bureaucratic nature, a revision can be useful.  
Firstly, the collection tasking is influenced. With the low-cost open source 
collection capabilities, intelligence analysts can be set more free to task the necessary 
collection, the external control over collection should be loosened. In fact, all people 
along the hierarchy should be their own master in open source collection tasking. Open 
sources exploitation facilities should be distributed evenly at all the hierarchical levels. 
Collection management for open source collection loosens. 
The distinction between collection and analysis weakens. The introduction of 
OSINT makes the intelligence analyst an intelligence collector as well. He/she no 
longer depends on others for collection. He/she only can request help in contacting the 
information sources he/she identifies. The collaboration and communication should be 
developed between the co-workers for identifying the information sources and having 
good contacts with them. 
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Source validation is positively affected. Declaration of the sources becomes less 
problematic. The knowledge of the utilized sources makes the intelligence consumers 
more comfortable. Reliability of the sources is shared and this meta-information 
becomes common among the intelligence analysts.  
In order to maximize the benefits with the OSINT: 
The development of private information providers should be supported and the 
intelligence organization should take the benefit of the private expertise when 
necessary.  
There should be collaborative development between the private information 
brokers and the intelligence analysts. Collaborative development provides the efficient 
and effective use of the resources. The principle is that if the intelligence agency can get 
the required open source intelligence on-time and at a very low cost compared to in-
house production, it should contact the private information brokers. In this 
collaboration, the intelligence community saves part of its resources and the broker 
earns money in return to continue its business. 
The intelligence consumer should have diversified sources of information. 
Information, intelligence self-reliance (dependance on the in-house open source 
capabilities) is not relevant. Direct contact with the information brokers, sources is 
required. Everyone in the intelligence hierarchy should be free to exploit the open 
sources and select its own customized desktop, working environment. There should be a 
technology tracking personnel that give advice to the intelligence analysts about the new 
information services, customized information retrieval choices, opportunities. 
The revision on the traditional intelligence model can be summarized as follows: 
Hierarchies are unavoidable. Every organization on Earth has a top decision-
maker and this means that at least two levels of hierarchy are present. Hierarchical 
structures are static in nature, some dynamism should be introduced. Purely static and 
purely dynamic solutions are not appropriate for the organizations involving people.  
There is a tradeoff between these two extremes. The following example pairs are 
good indicators of this tradeoff as well: 
 
• Central economy vs. market-based economy 
• Centralized government vs. decentralized system 
• Public vs. private sector 
  
• Corporate vs. individual 
• Traditional programming vs. extreme programming 
 
Organizations in traditional bureaucracies have an incentive to focus and 
exclude. Companies in the competitive market, on the other hand, have an incentive to 
search and expand. 25 These two powerful incentives should be combined in a common 
model. The key feature of this model can be stated as autonomy. Giving individuals 
great autonomy-search and expand facility and arriving at judgments at the corporate 
level by focusing and excluding.  
The classical intelligence hierarchy is shown below (Figure 4.1) as a multi-level 
tree: 
 
Intelligence Consumer
 
Figure 4.1 The traditional intelligence hierarchy. 
 
After the definition of an intelligence task by the intelligence consumer, the 
intelligence analysts to be worked on the defined intelligence task are selected. The 
selection should be made randomly out of a defined subgroup of people. In forming this 
subgroup there should be a balanced mixture of people from the different hierarchical 
level of the intelligence organization. (Figure 4.2-The selected members are 
highlighted) 
 
                                                          
25 Bruce D. Berkowitz, Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth Intelligence in the Information Age (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2000) 84. 
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Intelligence Consumer
Intelligence Analyst
 
Figure 4.2 Selection of a subgroup to perform the intelligence task. 
 
After determining the intelligence team for the defined intelligence task, one can 
think of the intelligence collection and analysis works of the assigned intelligence 
analysts the rings one within the other around the intelligence consumer. (Figure 4.3) In 
this representation the intelligence analyst has great autonomy in his/her OSINT 
exploitation and management and connection with the central authority. This direct 
connection increases the possibility of preparing a responsive, tailored intelligence 
product for the intelligence consumer.  
 
Intelligence Consumer
Intelligence Analyst
 
Figure 4.3 Proposed intelligence structure with OSINT. 
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In this configuration, the intelligence analysts can be evaluated as interfaces 
between the intelligence organization and their accessible information continuum. 
The OSI model vastly increases the number of analysts and makes the forum 
public. 26
In the proposed model, a team of analysts of different degrees of expertise is 
constructed. Each analyst in this team is equally distant from the intelligence consumer 
and exploit and manage its own information continuum and present his/her individual 
view to the intelligence consumer. Coordination process is executed among the team 
members with the contribution of the intelligence consumer. 
The intelligence team members access to one another through a common 
medium, the intelligence consumer returns a rapid feedback in this configuration. There 
is no hierarchy for the individual participants and information sources accessible in the 
intelligence analysts’ information continuum.27
This new intelligence team construction is especially suitable for the discrete 
intelligence. As for the continuous intelligence, the intelligence team should be changed 
at some intervals although not so frequent as for the discrete intelligence.  
The contribution of the issue experts to an intelligence task is necessary but not 
sufficient. Thus, unlike the classical intelligence model, the intelligence model with 
OSINT included recommends the inclusion of the other intelligence analysts to the 
intelligence team as well.  
With the introduction of OSINT, in addition to train the intelligence analysts as 
issue experts, some personnel should be trained so that they have moderate level 
knowledge of various issues. Because both an intensive study of a single subject 
(becoming one of the subject experts) and having moderate level knowledge of various 
subjects approaches one person to the excellency. (having the wisdom). 
In intelligence, it is useful to distinguish among “known facts”, “secrets”, and 
“mysteries”. Known facts can be readily observed. Secrets are facts that actually exist, 
but which an opponent is trying to hide. In principle, (if not in practice) secrets can be 
ascertained with enough effort and the right collection resources. Mysteries are things 
that cannot be discovered even in principle, because there are too many variables that 
may affect future events, or because a decision that will determine a future event has not 
26 “Implementing Open Source Intelligence:A Distributed Contribution Model,” Open Source Quarterly 
1.4, <http://www.osint.org/osq/v1n4/implementing.htm>. 
27 ibid. 
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yet been made. Known facts and secrets are amenable to analysis. The assessment of 
mysteries almost always depends on judgment. 28
The new model’s intelligence analysts coordinate to arrange the known facts and 
to discover secrets. (The other collection tasking) Each analyst presents his/her own 
judgment to the intelligence consumer thus the intelligence consumer evaluates the 
known facts and secrets and makes an overall judgment taking into consideration the 
analysts’ assessments of mysteries. 
28 Bruce D. Berkowitz, Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth Intelligence in the Information Age (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2000) 74-75. 
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Chapter 5 
A CASE STUDY OF OSINT: 
“XINJIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION:  
INCREASING INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES” 
 
China’s new regional policy to increase collaboration with the Central Asian 
States and attract foreign investors to provide the necessary capital offers great 
investment opportunities in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. 
 
5.1 Background 
 
5.1.1 Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 
 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is China’s northwest province. It borders 
with the newly independent Central Asian States in the west (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzistan) 
and northwest (Kazakhstan); Afghanistan, Pakistan in the southwest, Russia in the 
north. (See Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2) 
The major cities of it (for example Kashgar-Kashi) were once the trade, culture 
centers located on the famous Silk Road. The discovery of the new alternative 
transportation routes over sea and existent instability problems had caused the region to 
lose its importance. During recent years, however, because of its rich natural resources 
and its geographic location, it has come to the world’s attention again. 
The region is not one of the Chinese dominated areas in China. The population 
consists of a large number of ethnic minorities such as Uighurs of Turkic origin, 
Kazakhs etc. For a long time, Uighurs has dominated the population but Chinese have 
ruled the area.  
The region seeks great autonomy, independence from China. It suffers from the 
political and economic pressures of China. During the Chinese Civil War between 
1944-1949, the region claimed its independence and was named as East Turkestan. 
However, with the end of civil war, People’s Republic of China (PRC) regained its 
control over Xinjiang and Xinjiang has been declared as an autonomous region,  
  
 
Figure 5.1 Map of Asia. 29 (China marked)  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Map of China. 30 (Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region marked) 
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29 “The World Factbook-Asia,” 2004, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
reference_maps/asia.html>. 
30 “The World Factbook-China,” 2004, <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html>. 
  
 37
                                                          
province, district within which the various ethnic groups were promised “equality” with 
the Chinese majority. 31
However, the promise has not been kept yet. Quite a few Hans do not respect 
local minorities’ customs and way of life. Many big- and medium-scale enterprises, 
referring to all possible pretexts, refuse to employ minorities. As far as living standard 
is concerned, there is a big gap between minorities and Hans. Thus, a number of 
uprisings have been observed in different areas of Xinjiang. 32
Xinjiang is located in Central Asia-one of the geopolitically critical areas of the 
world. It’s an indispensable part of Central Asia and Central Asian conditions have 
strong influences on the region. Thus, it’s useful to know the Central Asian environment 
before going further on. 
 
5.1.2 Central Asia 
 
The term “Central Asia” can be interpreted in many ways. In this context, it 
refers to the entire subregion — comprising the former Soviet Central Asian Republics 
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and the 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China. 
Central Asia has some important characteristics: 
 
• The area is vast. It’s nearly 4,500 km from east to west. 
• It is landlocked and a long way from the leading international markets of 
Western Europe, North America, and the Pacific Rim. 
• The terrain varies from the second-lowest point on Earth, in the Turpan basin 
(154 meters [m] below sea level, in Xinjiang), to mountain peaks that rise to 
more than 7,400 m only a few kilometers away on the PRC-Kyrgyz Republic 
border. Inhospitable deserts cover much of Kazakhstan and western 
Uzbekistan. Thus, harsh conditions prevail. 
• The area is sparsely populated – the population of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Xinjiang PRC is about 61.9 million. 
31 “China: Uighur Muslim Separatists - Updated Special Report,” Mar. 2003, Virtual Information Center, 
<http://www.vicinfo.org/RegionsTop.nsf/cd9253f54ef331048 
a25682e00065544/c8a851e5a7f3d35f0a256cef000b7ce9?OpenDocument>. 
32 Felix K. Chang, “China's Central Asian power and problems,” Orbis 41.3 (1997), 415-416. 
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• It has a low population density (12.4 inhabitants per square kilometer) and it 
has an average per capita income that is quite low at $598 in 1995. 33 
• Central Asia has vast, largely untapped energy potential. Thus, energy 
projects and pipeline routes are of significant economic concern. 
• However, regional oil is not likely to have a significant impact on Western 
energy security or world oil prices. In comparison to the global energy 
resource base, regional oil and gas reserves represent a tiny fraction of 
overall supplies. The region accounts for only 2 percent of the world’s 
proven oil reserves. 34 
• Because of its location in the heart of Eurasia and its energy resources, the 
West has an interest in preventing any single country from establishing 
hegemony over the region. 
• Although Russia, Iran, Turkey, and China each have large geopolitical 
ambitions in the region, all of them lack the capability to establish an 
exclusive sphere of influence or achieve over-whelming dominance. There is 
no “vacuum” for ambitious neighbors to fill, and a multi-polar regional 
balance of power is evolving that will make it extremely difficult for any 
single country to establish regional hegemony. 35 
• Because of the substantial differences in history, culture, and economic status 
between the former Soviet Republics and the People’s Republic of China, 
these two parts of the Central Asian subregion are far more dissimilar than 
similar, making it impossible to apply broad generalizations to Central Asia. 
36 
• The region comprises weak, fragile, and unstable states (the former Soviet 
Republics). The greatest danger to regional order and stability is the 
possibility that one or more states will collapse under the crushing burden of 
internal problems. 37 
33 “Second Workshop on Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Energy,” 1999, Asian Development Bank, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/CAREC/Energy/default.asp>. 
34 R. Sokolsky, T. C. Paley, “Look before NATO leaps into the Caspian,” Orbis 43.2 (1999), 7, 12. 
35 ibid 3. 
36 “First Workshop on Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Transportation,” 1999, Asian Development Bank, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/CAREC/Transportation/default.asp?p=carcpub>. 
37 R. Sokolsky, T. C. Paley, “Look before NATO leaps into the Caspian,” Orbis 43.2 (1999), 12. 
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5.2 Recent Developments 
 
5.2.1 Central Asia 
 
Two major developments that have occurred in Central Asia in the recent past 
are: 
 
• The collapse of the Soviet Union. 
• The administrative vacuum in Afghanistan. 
 
These two developments have brought about some situational changes:  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union; new, independent Central Asian States 
have been founded. The foundation of these new independent national states has had 
influences on China. One influence is that the inhabitants in the Xinjiang Uighur 
Autonomous Region hoped they could claim their independence as well. Fears of Kazak 
nationalism among Chinese citizens, the Pan-Turkic movement and the Xinjiang 
Uyghur minority have appeared. Thus, there has been rise in ethnicity; and separatist 
movements have become a more significant threat for China.  
The breakup of the Soviet Union left the new, independent countries with few 
sources of manufactured goods and industrial inputs, little demand for their products, 
and an inadequate administrative and political framework to cope with the challenges of 
independence. Their economic future depends on developing new trading partners 
within their region, and new trading routes to markets outside their immediate 
neighborhood. 
Xinjiang PRC shares borders, economic interests, and cultural ties with former 
Soviet Central Asia. Lying along the historical “Silk Road,” the people in this region 
shared commerce and trade for centuries. The collapse of the Soviet Union makes it 
possible once again to develop economic cooperation and economic linkages within the 
region. 
Because of the transition from the central economy in the Soviet Union to the 
unplanned market economies, the Central Asian States have faced with big economic 
crisis and the economic influence of China has been more probable in the area. The 
border restrictions have been loosened. 
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Initiatives have been taken to create stable, prosperous, and independent nation-
states. International organizations such as the European Union, the World Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, 
the United Nations, and various nongovernmental relief and humanitarian agencies have 
used their comparative advantage to take responsibility in these initiatives. The 
measures to be utilized are defined as to support democratic reform, nation building, 
and market-led economic growth. In order to ensure the regional stability, these 
organizations try to control 
 
• access to energy supplies,  
• prevention of hegemony,  
• containment of conflict, and  
• prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation. 38 
 
The administrative vacuum in Afghanistan has caused the instability problems in 
the region. The ethnic minorities in Central Asia have moved to Afghanistan and there 
has been a rise of fundamentalist Islam especially when it is linked to separatist activity. 
Particularly after the 11th of September event in 2001 and its claimed links with 
Afghanistan, the United States has been introduced as a new power in Central Asia. 
Counter-terrorism has been a common mission for all the neighboring countries and 
major power sources. 
 
5.2.2 China 
 
China inside have gone through some changes as well: 
China has been a communist state that utilized strict political and economic 
controls. With the decline of communism, these controls particularly the economic ones  
have been more flexible. The market-oriented reforms and decentralized decision-
making have been introduced.  
The economic growth has become very important to Chinese leaders and the 
legitimacy of their rule, in light of the decline of communism as a unifying ideology. 39
38 R. Sokolsky, T. C. Paley, “Look before NATO leaps into the Caspian,” Orbis 43.2 (1999), 12-13. 
39 Felix K. Chang, “Chinese Energy and Asian Security,” Orbis 45.2 (2001), 2. 
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Sustained economic development has been the number one policy goal. PRC 
realized that it lacks the necessary capital to fulfill the requirements of all the regions. 
Thus, energy self-reliance principle has been broadened to include controlling remote 
energy resources and transportation links as well as discovering and processing the 
native resources.  
 
5.3 Consequences 
 
5.3.1 Evidences 
 
China’s influence is growing fast in Central Asian States. Political realities in 
Central Asia might be seen just by looking at street signs: in 1997, one of the leading 
boulevards in Bishkek – the Lenin Prospekt – had had a large section renamed to the 
Deng Xiaoping Prospekt. 40 41 Also, Central Asian markets are full of inexpensive, low-
quality Chinese goods. 42
In the frame of the cooperative development policy in Central Asia, China has 
taken the lead in forming the Shanghai Five consultative group (composed of China, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) that later evolved into the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) after the addition of Uzbekistan. The SCO’s stated 
objectives for China are as follows: 
 
• Resolving long-standing border issues with Russia and the newly 
independent Central Asia nations;  
• Creating a security mechanism for containing the chaos on the other side of 
its borders and isolating its own problems in Xinjiang;  
• Laying the groundwork for trade with and access to the key economic 
resources of Central Asia—including the increasingly important prospect of 
energy resources, and;  
40 “Forum One: The Current State of China-Central Asia Diplomacy and Implications for U.S. Foreign 
Policy-China's Emergence in Central Asia: Security, Diplomatic, and Economic Interests,” 2003, Center 
for Strategic & International Studies, <http://www.csis.org/china/030205_ce_forum01.pdf>. 
41 Mark Burles, “Chapter Four: Prospects for China's Influence in Central Asia,” 1999, 
<www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1045/MR1045.chap4.pdf>, 3. 
42 ibid 9. 
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• Establishing itself as a significant player in Central Asian affairs before the 
United States becomes too entrenched through NATO and Partnership for 
Peace initiatives and before the Russians attempted to reassert itself into its 
“near abroad.” 43 
 
The SCO’ s mission has been declared as to cooperate more thoroughly to deal 
with the “three evil forces”–terrorism, separatism, and extremism. 
The establishment of the SCO, largely spearheaded by the Chinese, is seen by 
many observers as part of a security strategy to prevent Kazakh or Uighur separatists 
from using Central Asian states as a safety zone to plot separatist activities in Xinjiang. 
It is also seen by some analysts as an organization that the Chinese have used to spread 
their sphere of influence, both economic and geopolitical, throughout Central Asia. 44
China has taken a military exercise with the Kyrgyz military in October 2001. It 
has been noted as the first combined exercise in the history of the PRC. 
China has focused on transportation and energy projects. Multiple long-term 
infrastructure projects, including oil and gas pipelines, roads, and railroads, have been 
initiated. 
There are amazing changes taking place in the restructuring of China’s oil and 
gas sector including the inflow of foreign capital. 45
 
5.3.2 Policy Details 
 
Recent developments, events in Central Asia have forced the big powers (for 
example China) to adapt new policies that are consistent with the new regional and 
global realities.  
China defines two essential national policy objectives as: 
 
● Maintaining the territorial integrity. 
43 “Forum One: The Current State of China-Central Asia Diplomacy and Implications for U.S. Foreign 
Policy-China's Emergence in Central Asia: Security, Diplomatic, and Economic Interests,” 2003, Center 
for Strategic & International Studies, <http://www.csis.org/china/030205_ce_forum01.pdf>, 3-4. 
44 “China’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism,” Dec. 2001, The Library of 
Congress, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7945.pdf>, 16. 
45 A. A. Parra, “Oil and gas in Central Asia and Northwest China James P Dorian; CWC Publishing 
Limited, London, UK, 174pp,” Energy Policy 30.15 (Dec. 2002). 
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China’s primary objective in the region is to maintain its own territorial integrity 
by ensuring that the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, historically a venue 
of Turkic and Muslim separatist agitation, remains firmly under Beijing’s 
control. 46
Three principal attributes make Xinjiang vital to China: its potentially rich 
hydrocarbon and mineral assets, its strategic location, and its relationship to the 
national legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The rise of 
regionalism in China threatens to undermine the CCP’s new legitimacy. The 
capability of China or the CCP in response to the ethnic groups like the Uighurs 
in Xinjiang that continue to agitate for greater autonomy is a very important 
concern. 47
Looking beyond their western border, Chinese leaders’ principal concern is that 
a rising tide of religious and ethnic turbulence in Central Asia might spill over 
into China. Thus, China’s international interests in Central Asia are firmly 
intertwined with its domestic interests in Xinjiang. Chinese policy is designed to 
maintain stability and contain ethnic, religious, and nationalist separatism 
through economic development of the region.  
Beijing remains hopeful that a combination of military force and economic 
prosperity brought about by reform and foreign investment in the region will 
help assuage the Uighurs’ antipathy toward China. 48
● Sustained economic development. 
With the weakened Russian influence in Central Asia since 1991, China has 
become a more active player, has growing interests. China evaluated regional 
concerns, its regional policy and has determined the short-term and long-term 
regional goals: 
China aims at creating a balance of power in the region that factors in itself, 
Russia, Iran, the United States, and other South Asian countries. This balance of 
power ensures for China that no power perceived to be hostile to China 
dominates the region. 49
46 R. Sokolsky, T. C. Paley, “Look before NATO leaps into the Caspian,” Orbis 43.2 (1999), 6. 
47 Felix K. Chang, “China's Central Asian power and problems,” Orbis 41.3 (1997), 2. 
48 ibid 20. 
49 “Forum One: The Current State of China-Central Asia Diplomacy and Implications for U.S. Foreign 
Policy-China's Emergence in Central Asia: Security, Diplomatic, and Economic Interests,” 2003, Center 
for Strategic & International Studies, <http://www.csis.org/china/030205_ce_forum01.pdf>, 6. 
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China’s Central Asian policy priorities involve: 
 
• Avoiding instability in the region. 
One of the Chinese objectives can be stated as border demarcation. China wants 
to ensure its security in the border regions. 50
The administrative vacuum in Afghanistan and the 11th of September attacks 
and their claimed links have affected the Chinese plans as well. With the 
introduction of the United States as a new power and a leader in counter-
terrorism, China has chosen to collaborate with the United States and containing 
terrorist threats has become a mission in China’s policy. 
Current Chinese leaders, though mindful of their country’s long tradition of 
energy self-reliance, are acutely aware that the legitimacy of their rule requires 
sustained economic growth, and that growth would be imperiled by regional 
instability. 51
China tries to keep a stabilized environment to go on with the economic growth. 
In this regard, PRC uses communication and diplomacy to resolve the 
discussions and disputes between the neighboring states and the other countries. 
China will not undertake military action solely over energy resources unless and 
until its access to those it has already developed through commercial agreements 
and diplomacy is seriously threatened. 52
• Securing access to energy resources. 
China evaluates the Central Asia as of critical importance for energy needs. PRC 
tries to ensure access to trade and natural resources in the region. Besides being  
as a source of energy supply, Central Asia is a means of transit to markets in  
Europe and the Middle East for China. 
The Chinese, moreover, want to prevent trouble in Central Asia from interfering 
with Beijing’s access to the region’s energy resources, including China’s 
potentially vast oil reserves in the Tarim Basin, or from hindering efforts to 
integrate neighboring Central Asian countries into the Chinese market. 
50 “Forum One: The Current State of China-Central Asia Diplomacy and Implications for U.S. Foreign 
Policy-China's Emergence in Central Asia: Security, Diplomatic, and Economic Interests,” 2003, Center 
for Strategic & International Studies, <http://www.csis.org/china/030205_ce_forum01.pdf>, 6. 
51 Felix K. Chang, “Chinese Energy and Asian Security,” Orbis 45.2 (2001), 29. 
52 ibid 30. 
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•  Expanding economic cooperation. 53 
PRC has realized that in the 21st century the concept of cooperative development 
is valid. There is no true development in isolation from the neighbors and the rest 
of the world. 
China’s current policy is to make the best use of international resources. China 
will be even more active [in] international market because there is not so much 
[recoverable] oil at home. 54
 
53 Mark Burles, “Chapter Four: Prospects for China's Influence in Central Asia,” 1999, 
<www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1045/MR1045.chap4.pdf>, 51. 
54 Felix K. Chang, “Chinese Energy and Asian Security,” Orbis 45.2 (2001), 29. 
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5.4 Investment Making (General Conditions) 
 
In the new global environment, investments are made within the frame of 
economic cooperation. With economic cooperation, nobody loses – each country can 
benefit. Economists refer to “zero sum games” and “non-zero sum games”. In a zero 
sum game, if one person wins, it is because somebody else has lost. In a non-zero sum 
game, it is possible for both sides to gain equally. And that is precisely the aim of 
economic cooperation. The challenge, though, is to understand and respect each other’s 
strategic interests and concerns, and to find strategies that allow each government to 
advance its own interests within the framework of a common action. 55
Economic cooperation can mean a lot of things to different people. It can be 
looked at as a continuum. At one end it is what is going on right now in Western Europe 
with an attempt to merge the economy, merge currencies, merge political institutions, 
and merge legal systems into a single entity. Or economic cooperation can be nothing 
more than an agreement between two countries to permit cars to pass across the borders 
or to reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade. 
The private sector usually consists of investors, the contractor, and lenders. The 
investment players are not merely the investors, the contractor, and lenders, but also 
include the government. 
A good investment environment is a cooperative environment between the 
government and the private sector. The success of a partnership for investment requires 
mutual benefit of the private sector and the government. It is based on the government’s 
acceptance and need to provide strategic infrastructure, combined with the private 
sector’s ability and willingness to operate such a service for profit. The private sector 
looks for the following criteria in making the investments: 
 
• Infrastructure, 
• Transport and communications, 
• Energy, 
• Policy environment. 
55 “Second Workshop on Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Energy,” 1999, Asian Development Bank, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/CAREC/Energy/default.asp>. 
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If there is no dependable infrastructure, transport and communications, and 
energy in a country or region, investments are made to make them available in the first 
place. 
In today’s environment, countries are not limited with their own finance and 
know-how capabilities. There are private bodies that want to help to finance projects 
and make business using their know-how. This investor willingness presents a 
wonderful opportunity. However, to attract such capital and know-how, there must first 
be the right economic, financial, and governance environment. 
Clear policies, transparency, probability of commercial success and stability are 
crucial factors for attracting private sector financing in projects. 
Key constraints for private sector participation in investments are as follows: 
 
• Governments view infrastructure as state or national assets. 
• Little desire by governments to privatize. 
• Unclear administrative procedures. 
• Protracted negotiations. 
• Underdeveloped legal and regulatory environment. 
• Currency risk. 
• Market risk. 
• Poor rate of return on investment: Lack of planning (there might be too 
much of one service and not enough of another) and excessive transaction 
costs can be the causes. 56 
 
Among the key elements for attracting private finance are: 57
 
• Rules of law and contract enforceability; 
• Creditworthiness both at the macroeconomic and enterprise levels. (country 
credit ratings); 
 
56 “First Workshop on Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Transportation,” 1999, Asian Development Bank, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/CAREC/Transportation/default.asp?p=carcpub>. 
57 “Second Workshop on Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Energy,” 1999, Asian Development Bank, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/CAREC/Energy/default.asp>. 
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• Sector policies 
The clear and strong support of the host government is an essential 
precondition for the flow of private sector investment into large capital-
intensive projects. The government should address the following policies 
for sectors: 58
 
• Maintenance of infrastructure: There must be a proper program of 
maintenance and there must be a budget for maintenance. 
• Technical standards: Sector-specific technical standards should be 
well determined. 
• Customs regulations: Customs have a key function in any country’s 
economy. They have a preventive function to stop things coming in 
that country does not want. They have a tax collecting function to 
collect revenue, to which the government is entitled, import duty, 
taxes, and so on. But those procedures and regulations need to be 
simple and clear so that every trader understands them. Issues of 
harmonization of customs procedures between the countries are 
issues that are critical for economic cooperation. 
• Security and control points: Every country needs security on its 
borders. Security means checking and controlling people and traffic 
whether it is at the airport or at the border point. What that is not 
needed is a whole series of unofficial control points or internal 
control points within the country. Government policy should 
combine an effective order of security with a freedom of internal 
travel. 
• Border crossing procedures: The border crossing procedures should 
be as simple and as clearly defined as possible. They complement the 
previous two regulations by providing the facilities for the passengers 
and vehicles crossing the border. 
58 “First Workshop on Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Transportation,” 1999, Asian Development Bank, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/CAREC/Transportation/default.asp?p=carcpub>. 
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• Trade facilitation: Trade facilitation means improving methods of 
payment for goods. It means having an effective and efficient 
banking system that will issue letters of credit, and provide efficient 
credit transfers and payment. It usually means allowing a free flow of 
currency across borders. It also means reduction of import and export 
restrictions to allow a free flow of goods between one country and 
another. That is combined wherever possible with a reduction or 
elimination of import tariffs to encourage economic cooperation and 
trade development between the participating countries. 
• Customer orientation: Customer requirements should be taken into 
consideration so that investments in sectors should provide the 
customers more choices. 
• Service provision: The three basic requirements of the provided 
services are they must be efficient, they must offer acceptable levels 
of comfort and safety, and they must be affordable. 
• Performance standards: The investment partners should agree on a 
basic standard of performance. This provides the consistency of 
service that will be available.  
• Transparent legal and regulatory frameworks to signal pricing/tariff policies; 
 
The regulatory framework can perhaps be divided into phases: 
 
• First phase: This would be to attract investment by adopting a 
clear and transparent regulatory framework; 
• Second phase: This is in the actual processing of project 
proposals. It should demonstrate that the rules will remain the 
same and constant – that again generates certainty; and 
• Third phase: This, perhaps the most important is sustainability.  
 
• Bankability of investments (Guaranteed to bring profit); 
• Creation of effective domestic capital markets and institutional capabilities; 
and 
• Government commitment to sustain an effective action to reform, long-term 
planning, and change. 
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5.5 Investment Making Criteria vs. Current Policies in Xinjiang-Central 
Asia 
 
Xinjiang PRC and the former Soviet Central Asian States try to attract foreign 
investors by providing a proper policy environment for the transportation and energy 
sectors at first. 
Transportation and energy are the two main sectors that are very critical for 
Xinjiang and Central Asia. A country/region cannot grow or develop without 
transportation. It is especially important for Central Asia because of the distances 
involved, and also because the countries are landlocked and must go through another 
country to export. 59
Transport and energy sectors require a powerful infrastructure. However, 
Xinjiang and Central Asia lack the necessary infrastructure. Thus, there are tremendous 
opportunities to build infrastructure in Central Asia. 60
The region has valuable energy resources. Therefore, most private foreign 
investment in Central Asia has focused on providing technology and expertise for 
developing the potential of the subregion’s oil and gas fields. 61
China aims at sustained economic growth and this requires more energy because 
there is a simple and straightforward relationship between economic and energy growth 
– when an economy grows, more energy is consumed. A powerful infrastructure and 
developed transportation facilities in Central Asia means the easier links to Middle East 
(full of valuable energy resources) for China and of highest priority. 
Xinjiang PRC has developed a preferential policy environment for encouraging 
foreign investment. Following are the factors and evidences in Xinjiang, which increase 
the probability of successful investments: 
 
• Xinjiang PRC, which has many ethnic groups, is remotely located and is a 
comparatively backward place. Some people have a low standard of living 
59 Felix K. Chang, “China's Central Asian power and problems,” Orbis 41.3 (1997). 
60 “First Workshop on Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Transportation,” 1999, Asian Development Bank, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/CAREC/Transportation/default.asp?p=carcpub>. 
61 “Second Workshop on Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Energy,” 1999, Asian Development Bank, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/CAREC/Energy/default.asp>. 
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and infrastructure is poor. As a result, people show their enthusiastic and 
strong support for those projects they believe could help them reduce 
poverty. This important factor makes for the smooth implementation of key 
projects.  
• In recent years the PRC has strengthened exchanges and cooperation with 
other countries in the transportation field. The Central Government and 
Xinjiang PRC’s Regional Government have signed about 10 bilateral or 
multilateral transportation agreements with neighboring countries, paving the 
way for regional cooperation. 
• The Central Government and Region’s Legislative Department have also 
passed a series of regulations and laws to protect investors. 62 
• Xinjiang PRC passed Electric Power Law (1995) and Highway Law (1989) 
to encourage private sector participation in energy and transportation sectors.  
• The PRC is encouraging foreign investment and participation in domestic oil 
activities as part of the country’s open-door policy and to facilitate the 
renovation of its energy industry. Government officials of Xinjiang PRC 
have even more leeway to solicit foreign investment because of the 
autonomous status of the province and its remoteness. 63 
• Global capital in the form of foreign direct investment is to flow to Xinjiang 
and Central Asia. The organizations such as ADB, IMF, and World Bank 
have great willingness to invest in Xinjiang because of its strategic 
importance and rich energy reserves. There are also other private investors 
that want to sell their know-how exploiting the region’s poor know-how 
capability, underdeveloped situation. 
• China seems to advance in the sustained economic growth goal. According to 
Euromoney, GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth accelerated to 7.3% in 
2001, and although slightly lower than the 8% in 2000, China was still the 
star growth country globally. Total nominal GDP rose from US$1.08 trillion 
62 “First Workshop on Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Transportation,” 1999, Asian Development Bank, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/CAREC/Transportation/default.asp?p=carcpub>. 
63 “Second Workshop on Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Energy,” 1999, Asian Development Bank, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/CAREC/Energy/default.asp>. 
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in 2000 to US$1.16 trillion in 2001, as China implemented expansive fiscal 
and monetary policies in order to stimulate weak private investment and 
consumption. 
Signaling strengthening foreign interest in China, the nation's accession into 
the WTO (World Trade Organization) and the opening up of the mainland 
market helped boost foreign direct investment into the country by 14.9% 
year-on-year in 2001. China's accession is expected to bring with it wide 
ranging reforms, which will further open its economy and lead to greater 
global integration and increased access to foreign investors. Moreover, 
according to government estimates, China's successful bid to host the 2008 
Olympic Games could add an average of 0.3% to 0.4% to its annual growth 
in the next seven years. In a bid to maintain its high growth rates, China 
lowered key interest rates for the first time since June 1999. 64
In the Euromoney rankings for March 2004, China has been ranked 45 out of 
185 countries. 65
Typically, these credit ratings rank countries in terms of their ability to pay 
back loans, or their ability to raise finance. The indicators used to come up 
with this rating system are as follows: economic performance, political risk, 
investment and tax legislation, debt indicators (how much the government of 
that country is in debt), and access to international finance. 
These and other rankings cannot claim absolute accuracy, but companies do 
look at this kind of table in order to ensure that they are familiar with the 
risks of the individual countries that they are about to invest in. 66
 
 
64 “China,” 2004. Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC, 
<http://www.euromoney.com/default.asp?page=888&/public/regions/eastasia/ 
china/header.html&/public/regions/eastasia/china//briefings/china.html>. 
65 “Country Risk - Results&Methodology,” Euromoney Mar. 2004. 
66 “Second Workshop on Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Energy,” 1999, Asian Development Bank, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/CAREC/Energy/default.asp>. 
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However, some evidences are not in favor of investment making in Xinjiang: 
 
• The PRC has a very rigorous screening process, which must be followed 
for projects. As an example; there are no transport projects in Xinjiang 
PRC in the Asian Development Bank’s country program. To put projects 
in the country program, the Xinjiang PRC authorities will have to liaise 
very closely with the State Planning Commission and the People’s Bank 
of China. Without their agreement, ADB cannot finance transport 
projects in the Xinjiang PRC region. 67 
• The newly independent republics along Russia’s southern border are 
potentially weak and unstable. Over the next ten to fifteen years the states 
will face serious internal and intraregional threats: tribal, ethnic, and clan 
disputes; severe poverty and growing disparities in income distribution; 
immature political institutions, civil societies, and national identities; 
environmental degradation; political repression and a lack of 
constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power; rapid 
population growth; mass urbanization; conflict over land, water, energy, 
and mineral resources; ethnic separatism; and pervasive corruption, 
crime, and cronyism. In brief, the region displays all the problems that 
can result in “failed” states, and the area’s potential instability could lead 
to crisis and perhaps even chaos, especially since regional institutions for 
cooperation are still tenuous and largely ad hoc.” 68 
• In Xinjiang PRC, national policies restrict government officials’ ability to 
attract foreign investors. Until recently, for example, the PRC did not 
permit foreign electricity projects to earn reasonable rates of return for 
fear of opposition by local electricity consuming industries. The 
restrictions were relaxed only in 1997 because few foreign companies 
were considering making electricity investments. The Central 
Government remains reluctant to privatize the country’s power sector, 
however, given the difficult valuation and ownership issues and the fact 
67 “First Workshop on Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Transportation,” 1999, Asian Development Bank, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/CAREC/Transportation/default.asp?p=carcpub>. 
68 R. Sokolsky, T. C. Paley, “Look before NATO leaps into the Caspian,” Orbis 43.2 (1999), 10. 
  
 54
                                                          
that the sector is considered key to the country’s national security 
strategy. Therefore, notwithstanding the recent opening of Tarim to 
foreign investors, Xinjiang PRC officials were not able to offer investors 
the most promising areas of the basin because of Central Government 
restrictions.  
• Unstable and untested policies in the region jeopardize the investments in 
Xinjiang. The biggest concerns for potential investors in Central Asia, 
whether private companies or international lending agencies, are the 
unstable tax, currency, investment, and environmental policies that could 
jeopardize their investments.  
• Instability in government would reduce the attractiveness of the 
investment environment. Potential investors in the sector are concerned 
about the rise of nationalistic and separatist movements that may threaten 
ownership rights and subregional political stability. The extended civil 
disturbance in Tajikistan and continued armed conflict in nearby 
Afghanistan constitute a permanent backdrop to development in the 
subregion and increase the risks associated with investing in the energy 
sector. 69 
 
In conclusion, Xinjiang PRC offers increasing investment opportunities 
in particular in infrastructure, transportation and communications, and 
energy sectors. China has great willingness and decisiveness to preserve 
the regional stability, to develop Xinjiang, to sustain its economic 
growth. Thus, China is ready to do its best to provide a proper investment 
environment, reduce the risks. The other Central Asian States are highly 
influenced by China and behave in cooperation with China to develop 
Central Asia as a whole. Thus, there are more legitimate reasons for an 
investment being successful than failed if investors select the appropriate 
sectors and take into consideration the general and sectorial policy issues 
69 “Second Workshop on Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Energy,” 1999, Asian Development Bank, 
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/CAREC/Energy/default.asp>. 
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Chapter 6 
OSINT MAKING:  
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDY 
 
In the contemporary intelligence model, an individual intelligence analyst is 
his/her own manager in OSINT making, arranges his/her customized environment to 
exploit open sources, and has direct relationship with the policymaker.  
The objective of this chapter is to define some general rules in OSINT making 
that were used in OSINT case study previously.  
 
6.1 OSINT Case Study 
 
In the OSINT case study, a single unit with temporal and spatial boundaries is 
chosen 70 and with the application of OSINT techniques and intelligence reporting 
principles on the defined unit, a final open sources intelligence product is produced. 
(Chapter 5 is comprised of the prepared OSINT case study.) 
The definition of the intelligence problem starts the OSINT process. The defined 
problem for the case study is as follows: 
“The feasibility of making investment, business in China’s Xinjiang province (or 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region) in the first decade of the 21st century.” 
First of all, the understanding of the defined intelligence problem is very critical. 
The correct approach to the intelligence problem should be utilized. In this approach, 
the intelligence analyst should concentrate not on whether an event is likely, but on how 
and why it might come about. 71
In producing OSINT, the following phases are experienced: 
 
• Exploration-Discovery. 
The aim of this phase is to discover the nature of the intelligence problem. In 
order to get the nature of the defined case study problem, it’s necessary to do  
70 John Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?” American Political Science Review 
Oct. 2003. 
71 Analytic Toolkit, CIA Directorate of Intelligence 1997. 
  
exploration first. Some exploration is useful to form the background. Only after  
spending time in exploration, can discovery be possible. Both the exploration 
and the discovery are done in the digital environment. In exploring the case 
study topic, it’s a good habit to note the footprints-to organize bookmarks. To 
bookmark the web pages visited in a specific date, in a specific folder named 
that date serves this purpose. (See Figure 6.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Organization of Bookmarks. 
 
Navigating through the Web, it’s a good practice as well to store the important 
documents locally, as they can be unavailable after some time. In storing these 
documents, one common digital format should be chosen and the stored copy 
should be browsable and indexed. As for the experienced case study, Adobe 
Acrobat 6.0 Professional is selected as the storage software and the indexing 
capability provided by Acrobat Catalog is utilized. In the left part of the 
following figure, the searches are done on the generated index for the locally 
stored documents and at the right pane the usage of underlining on one stored 
document is shown.  
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Figure 6.2 The Index Generated by Acrobat Catalog for the Locally Stored Documents 
and the Use of Underlining on one of the Stored Documents. 
 
Discovering the special vocabulary specific to the case study topic in the 
relevant languages is an important beginning point. Especially, if the spatial 
boundary for the studied case is geographic, the acquaintance of the target 
locations, areas should be developed and their relative positions on the map 
should be known.  
Discovering the subject-matter experts contributes strongly to retrieve the nature 
of the intelligence problem as well. The foreign language knowledge and the 
expertise field should be used as main criteria in selecting these individuals. 
(Figure 6.3) 
 
• Discrimination. 
Discriminating between various sources of information is vital. 
A qualified open service and open source have some characteristics. 
A qualified open service generally requires a subscription. A subscription fee is 
required to access, or a free trial period is given before requesting a subscription 
fee or the access is permitted freely only after the provision of the contact  
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Figure 6.3 Discovering the Subject-matter Experts. 
 
information, the personal and organizational details. Thus, journal results are 
safer than web results. 
A qualified open source is expected to be low-cost rather than free.  
The existence of the references within a document increases its credibility. If the 
source of the material is given, the material is worth further consideration. 
Source attribution makes it possible to drill down to the original source so that it 
could be evaluated. 
A journal article that is accessed through a limited access electronic database 
(ScienceDirect), which includes references can be evaluated as a qualified open 
source as shown in Figure 6.4. 
It is necessary to check the original source before accepting quoted material. 
Sources needed to be weighed against one another with more reliability 
attributed to newer and specialist publications and less to older and generalist 
publications. 
Unsourced information is useful if it can be independently collaborated. 
Seemingly unrelated information can be useful in deducing and collaborating 
other information. 
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Figure 6.4 An example qualified source. 
 
For the experienced OSINT case study 15 days of discovery and discrimination 
effort (approximately two hours per day) have taken place. 
 
• Validation. 
Validation comes in two forms: Information verification and source validation. 
The information that is repeated in different open sources many times most 
probably is true. However, there is a possibility that all the same information is 
the copies from one main source. Thus, it’s a useful and necessary practice to go 
over the references sections of a given document to find the original source of 
information. For example; in our case study, one web source verifies the 
information available from a journal source however it’s just the copy of the 
same information because the web source gives that journal source as reference. 
(Figure 6.5) 
For the experienced case study, footnotes are used extensively to represent 
source attribution. The footnote represents the main source of information. 
There are other sources which repeat the same information included in the main 
source thus verify it. Therefore; for every referenced information in the case  
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Figure 6.5 An Example Information Repetition. 
 
study, the main reference and the other verifying references are listed in a chart 
and the average number of verifying sources per reference is computed. The 
chart and the results are given in Appendix. 
Establishing human contact and verifying information through this contact is 
very helpful in validation efforts. One human is reached in the case study to 
request information and experience from. His opinions regarding the investment 
environment in Xinjiang are as follows: 
 
John_Magill@dai.com:“I do know that we were impressed by the amount of 
construction and investment -- mostly public -- that was taking place in 
Urumqi.” 
 
At an upper level, the credibility and knowledge of one human expert and/or 
author can be validated by another human expert. For example, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski’ s expertise is confirmed by another subject-matter expert in the case 
study. 
Additionally, it should be kept in mind that open sources are not sufficient to do 
source validation; the intelligence analysts utilize all kinds of sources and 
services not only the open ones in the validation task.  
 60
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• Distillation. 
Distillation is done to reduce the compiled material to only the essential 
information needed for the readers to make decisions or use the information.  
The first step in the distillation process is the crafting of the title. In our case, 
geographic and topical mix title is constructed. (Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region: Increasing Investment Opportunities) 
The intelligence report is organized around the following outline: 
 
• Title 
• Major Judgment/Point 
• Background Information 
• The Recent Developments 
• Consequences (Resulting Policies) 
- Evidences 
- Policy Details 
• General Conditions 
• Conclusion 
- Assertions that are in favor of the major judgment 
- Assertions that are against the major judgment 
- Concluding paragraph 
 
Every section is organized around a main theme and first paragraphs in the 
section hold a core assertion. The succeeding paragraphs are comprised of 
supportive statements to the core assertion and one idea per paragraph principle 
is applied. 72
The source information is given for all the facts. Thus, it is clear the distinction 
between the facts and mysteries and judgments. 
 
• Delivery. 
Appropriate delivery of the distilled information is essential. The delivery option 
is selected so that it’s the most appropriate for the target.  
72 Analytic Thinking and Presentation for Intelligence Producers Analysis Training Handbook, Office of 
Training and Education. 
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6.2 Findings/Recommendations 
 
Here are some findings and recommendations for the intelligence analyst in 
OSINT making: 
 
6.2.1 OSINT Analysis Measures 
 
For the evaluation of an OSINT process, some measures for analysis (listed in 
Table 6.1) can be stated. Table 6.2 gives these measures with their corresponding values 
for the experienced case study. 
 
Table 6.1 OSINT Analysis Measures. 
 
OSINT Budget  
Total Surfing Time 
Total 
Bookmarked 
Item Count 
Bookmarked 
Item Count 
Per Hour 
Utilized 
Bookmarked 
Item Count 
Locally Stored File Count 
Exploration-Discovery 
Total Size of the Collected Material 
Total Size of the 
Web Sources 
Total Size of Every 
Other Open Source 
Material 
File Count for the 
Web Sources 
File Count for Every 
Other Open Source 
Material 
Number of Human Contacts 
Discrimination 
Broken Link Count for Locally Stored Files
Total Size of the Final Report 
Referenced Material (Footnote) Count 
Validation & Distillation 
Information Verification Per Footnote Item 
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Table 6.2 OSINT analysis measures with their corresponding values for the experienced 
OSINT case study. 
 
OSINT Budget No budget except subscribed limited access electronic database 
Total Surfing Time 30 hours 
Total 
Bookmarked 
Item Count 
50 Bookmarked 
Item Count 
Per Hour 
2 Utilized 
Bookmarked 
Item Count 
29 
Locally Stored File Count 31 
Exploration-
Discovery 
Total Size of the Collected 
Material 
12 MB 
Total Size of 
the Web 
Sources 
6 MB Total Size of the 
Journal Sources 73
6 MB 
File Count for 
the Web 
Sources 
26 File Count for the 
Journal Sources 
5 
Number of Human Contacts 1 
Discrimination 
Broken Link Count for 
Locally Stored Files 
1 
Total Size of the Final 
Report 
200 KB 
Referenced Material 
(Footnote) Count 
42 
Validation & 
Distillation 
Information Verification Per 
Footnote Item 
3 
 
• It’s very important to establish a comfortable and customized working 
environment to access and store information. It’s also very essential to exploit 
different kinds of open sources taking into consideration their nature, weak and 
strong points. (The kinds of open sources are explained in Chapter 3) 
• Diversified open sources make huge amounts of information available to the 
intelligence analyst. These information contain many repetitions, many useless 
parts, are far to represent an integrated whole. The reality is that although the 
amount of information available for exploration tends to increase with time, the 
usable part of it remains almost the same. (Figure 6.6) This means that 
knowledge creation is far less slow than reproducing it in various forms. The 
intelligence analyst explores the open sources world, tries to extract from it the 
usable part of the information, and evaluating the usable part makes judgments. 
                                                          
73 ScienceDirect (limited access electronic database accessed through university library), 2004, 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com>. 
  
 
Figure 6.6 The New Intelligence Gap. (www.oss.net) 
 
• Human sources should be of primary concern in OSINT making because they 
are the creators of the knowledge. Once created, the knowledge is represented 
and repeated in many forms, mediums. Trying to extract the usable part from the 
available information is in reality trying to reach the human knowledge. In 
evaluating the human knowledge, the possible errors in human knowledge and 
disinformation efforts should be taken into consideration.  
• Subject matter experts probably exist on all subjects and they are essential in 
providing a reliable base of information on which to build analysis, 
• Once the human sources are recognized, it’s helpful to investigate the open 
source material edited or authored by them to check their consistency thus the 
consistency of the information provided by them. 
• Huge open sources capabilities present a cooperative environment for 
intelligence analysts. In this cooperative environment, the mutual benefit is 
essential. The information requester and the information provider should 
exchange something and as a result of this exchange both parties should have a 
gain. The exchanges are in general money-information.  
• Identifying key personalities for the defined case is very critical and getting the 
information from them is more difficult in compared with the other open 
sources. The money-information exchange does not work. The human sources 
respond if they feel a collaboration. There should be a legitimate reason for 
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him/her to respond. Information-information exchange is ideal in getting the 
information from the human experts.  
• Storage of meta-information is very critical. In searching information through 
open sources; authors are the most critical meta-information to evaluate the 
quality and validity of the information.  
• People tend to specialize in some areas and write on similar topics. For an 
intensive study of a single topic; it’s a good search strategy to look for other 
materials that have the same authors, editors once you find information of high 
quality. 
• Foreign language is an important barrier in evaluating open sources. It’s one of 
the reasons for relying on other people (information brokers, human experts that 
can speak the relevant foreign languages) to acquire the required information. In 
return, it’s one of the criteria in identifying key personalities for the defined 
topic. 
• Some proprietary and/or classified sources as well as information may become 
open in time or vice versa. Thus, sustainable exploration of open source 
opportunities is required.  
• The unavailable documents that were once available can reveal something. In 
order to detect these kinds of documents, local storage of essential documents is 
required. 
• The Adobe Acrobat System can be proposed as the storage and organization 
software. Acrobat stores documents in their original format. It also includes 
useful utility programs for adding and reading comments on stored documents. 
Acrobat also allows hypertext linking within and between documents.74 
• Beyond the Adobe Acrobat System, there is a need for an intelligence software 
that fulfills the requirements of every phase of the OSINT process.  
 
6.2.2 OSINT Software 
 
OSINT software is not an automatic OSINT generator, it is just a facilitator. It 
presents a customizable working environment to the intelligence analyst and displays 
74 Mats Björe, “Six Years of Open Source Information: Lessons Learned,” Open Source Quarterly 1.1 
(1995), <http://www.osint.org/osq/v1n1/sixyears.htm>. 
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different views of information so that the intelligence analyst evaluates it appropriately. 
Thus, OSINT software is a tool that adds value to the intelligence process. 
It should not be evaluated just as a software component but as a whole that is 
composed of multiple software components. It is not just a database, a search engine, an 
internet tool, or a communication facility but it comprises 
 
• databases, 
• search engines, 
• internet tools, and 
• communication facilities. 
 
The specifications of the required software can be determined by analyzing the 
requirements of every phase of the OSINT process. Thus, a grouping of specifications 
can be made according to OSINT phases. The required software specifications are listed 
below in groups: 
 
Exploration-Discovery 
• Facilitates the intelligence workflow and collaboration. 
• Searches the Internet. 
• Searches through the information repository of the intelligence organization 
• In order to provide the sustainability to the exploration and discovery efforts; 
notifies the intelligence analyst of every new, updated information that is present 
in the selected open services in the determined areas. 
• Searches / Finds / Organizes bookmarks. 
• Checks the bookmark links periodically and notifies the changed / broken links. 
• Has the indexing capability on the stored documents. 
 
Discrimination 
• Stores information in one common format. 
• Has the commenting and underlining facilities. 
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Validation 
• Adds relationships between the stored document, its bibliographic reference 
information, and the internet address it is downloaded from. 
• Links reference information to the actual reference (if exists) 
- Displaying the reference trees, accessing the required reference... 
• Relates the author part of the bibliographic reference information to the contact 
information of that author. 
 
Distillation 
• Lists the primary source and the other verifying sources for a citation. 
• Lists the utilization ratio of sources as primary sources and / or secondary 
sources of information. 
• Relates the final report to the collected material for the report. 
 
Distribution 
• Makes conversion between different kinds of document formats. 
• Distributes the finished intelligence using various communication facilities such 
as e-mail, Internet, corporate intranet, and wireless devices. 
 
The described OSINT software supports the OSINT process by increasing the 
efficiency and the effectiveness. The software does not have the analysis functionality, 
the analysis is done only by human beings. Thus, intelligence is a human-driven process 
that needs to be supported by a powerful software. 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The objective of this thesis work is:  
 
• to analyze intelligence in the 21st century,  
• to state the importance of open sources intelligence (OSINT),  
• to define OSINT integrated intelligence model, and  
• to describe the OSINT making process by a case study of OSINT.  
 
Intelligence has gone through some changes in recent years. New threat types, 
new intelligence missions have appeared, the old missions have started to be processed 
differently. The diversified open sources and services and the time pressure upon action 
have shaped the new intelligence process. Open sources intelligence has started being 
used extensively in intelligence production. A revision is required in the highly static 
intelligence model to integrate it with the open sources intelligence. This revision 
requires to introduce some dynamism and individualization to intelligence work and to 
organize the intelligence budget in a more efficient and effective way. The OSINT 
integrated intelligence model proposes direct relationships between the policymaker and 
the intelligence analysts, sets every intelligence analyst as the manager of his/her own 
OSINT making process, and leaves the tasking of the riskier intelligence collection to 
the policymaker that coordinates with the intelligence analysts directly. Thus, the 
intelligence analysts serve as the interfaces between the open sources world and the 
intelligence organization. 
The intelligence analysts’ OSINT making process is described as well. The key 
points in this process are to handle the huge amounts of information collected via open 
sources and services, to do source validation, and to distill the compiled information to 
serve the policymaker. A case study of OSINT is prepared for the intelligence problem: 
“The feasibility of making investment, business in China’s Xinjiang province (or 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region) in the first decade of the 21st century.” The 
analysis of the case study is done to describe every followed phase and to give input, 
process, and output information for the phases. 
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In conclusion, an intelligence analyst’s OSINT making process is experienced 
with the lack of an OSINT budget and the findings/recommendations from this 
experience is documented. 
Some OSINT analysis measures are devised to attach an OSINT report and these 
measures are presented with their corresponding values for the case study. 
Design criteria for an OSINT software are prepared and grouped according to 
OSINT phases. 
In the future, the same work can be experienced with an OSINT budget and a 
comparison can be made between the two. 
An intelligence team to evaluate its effectiveness and efficiency can utilize the 
proposed new intelligence model. 
An OSINT software that fulfills the stated design criteria can be developed. 
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SUMMARY 
 
In this study, evaluation of the open sources in the contemporary intelligence 
production is examined. The study is comprised of seven chapters: 
In Chapter 1; intelligence is defined, the basic terminology is given, the 
intelligence process (cycle) and some basic concepts are explained. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the intelligence analysis. Contemporary intelligence 
analysis issues are examined and the required qualifications are given for the 
contemporary intelligence analyst. 
In Chapter 3; openness concept is explained, in the light of this concept 
information is categorized, open sources information and intelligence are defined, and 
the range of open sources are stated and explained. 
Chapter 4 makes an interrogation of the traditional intelligence model with the 
introduction of the diversified open sources, a new OSINT integrated intelligence model 
is proposed and explained. 
Chapter 5 is comprised of an OSINT case study regarding “the feasibility of 
investment making in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in the first decade of the 
21st century”. 
In Chapter 6; the OSINT case study is analyzed, some measures for analysis are 
given, some findings/recommendations are stated and the design principles for an 
OSINT software are determined. 
Chapter 7 concludes the study with the final words and future recommendations. 
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ÖZET 
 
Bu çalışmada, günümüz istihbarat dünyasında açık kaynakların değerlendirmesi 
yapılmıştır. Çalışma yedi bölümden oluşmaktadır: 
1. Bölüm’ de istihbarat tanımlanmış, temel istihbarat terminolojisi verilmiş, 
istihbarat döngüsü ve bazı istihbarat temel kavramları açıklanmıştır. 
2. Bölüm’ de istihbarat analizi ele alınmış ve günümüz koşullarında istihbarat 
analizi irdelenmiş ve bu analizi yapacak istihbarat analistlerinin gerekli özellikleri ifade 
edilmiştir. 
3. Bölüm’ de açıklık kavramı ortaya konmuş, bilgi bu kavram ışığında 
sınıflandırılmış, açık kaynak bilgisi ve istihbaratı tanımlanmış, ulaşılabilir açık 
kaynaklar incelenmiştir. 
4. Bölüm, çok çeşitli açık kaynakların ulaşılabilir hale gelmesi ile geleneksel 
istihbarat modelini sorgulamaktadır. Açık kaynak istihbaratı ile bütünleştirilmiş yeni bir 
istihbarat modeli önerilmiş ve açıklanmıştır. 
5. Bölüm, “Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi’nde yatırım yapma” konusunda 
hazırlanmış bir açık kaynak istihbaratı durum incelemesini içermektedir. 
6. Bölüm’ de, hazırlanan açık kaynak istihbaratı durum incelemesinin analizi 
yapılmış, bazı analiz ölçütleri verilmiş, bazı bulgu/öneriler ifade edilmiş ve açık kaynak 
istihbaratı yapmaya yönelik bir yazılımın tasarım ilkeleri saptanmıştır. 
7. Bölüm genel değerlendirmenin yapıldığı sonuç ve öneriler bölümüdür. 
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APPENDIX 
THE SAMPLE SHEETS PREPARED FOR 
 INFORMATION VERIFICATION  
 
 
Foot
note 
ID 
Primary Source Other Sources 
 
31 China-
UighurMuslimSeparatists-
SpecialReportweb 
chinas_central_asian_power_and_problems.pdf 
 shanghai_five.pdf 
 workshop_central_asia_2.pdf 
 sincan_uygur_ozerk_bolgesi 
 
32 chinas_central_asian_power_a
nd_problems.pdf 
China-UighurMuslimSeparatists-SpecialReportweb 
 shanghai_five.pdf 
 
33 workshop_central_asia_2.pdf look_before_NATO_leaps_into_the_Caspian.pdf 
 workshop_central_asia_1.pdf 
 
34 look_before_NATO_leaps_into_
the_Caspian.pdf 
chinese_energy_and_asian_security.pdf 
 PRCEnergyPolicyintheFive-YearPlan 
 sincan_uygur_ozerk_bolgesi_2 
 
35 look_before_NATO_leaps_into_
the_Caspian.pdf 
030205_ce_forum01.pdf 
 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 chinas_central_asian_power_and_problems.pdf 
 shanghai_five.pdf 
 
36 workshop_central_asia_1.pdf China-UighurMuslimSeparatists-SpecialReportweb 
 central_asian_legitimacy.pdf 
 
37 look_before_NATO_leaps_into_
the_Caspian.pdf 
030205_ce_forum01.pdf 
 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 shanghai_five.pdf 
 central_asian_legitimacy.pdf 
 
38 look_before_NATO_leaps_into_
the_Caspian.pdf 
030205_ce_forum01.pdf 
 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 chinas_central_asian_power_and_problems.pdf 
 chinese_energy_and_asian_security.pdf 
 workshop_central_asia_2.pdf 
 workshop_central_asia_1.pdf 
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39 chinese_energy_and_asian_sec
urity.pdf 
chinas_central_asian_power_and_problems.pdf 
 PRCEnergyPolicyintheFive-YearPlan 
 
40 030205_ce_forum01.pdf prospects_for_chinas_influence_in_central_asia.pdf 
 
41 prospects_for_chinas_influenc
e_in_central_asia.pdf 
030205_ce_forum01.pdf 
 
42 prospects_for_chinas_influenc
e_in_central_asia.pdf 
030205_ce_forum01.pdf 
 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 chinas_central_asian_power_and_problems.pdf 
 
43 030205_ce_forum01.pdf 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 shanghai_five.pdf 
 China-UighurMuslimSeparatists-SpecialReportweb 
 
44 shanghai_five.pdf 030205_ce_forum01.pdf 
 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 China-UighurMuslimSeparatists-SpecialReportweb 
 
45 oil_and_gas_in_Xinjiang.pdf 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 PRCEnergyPolicyintheFive-YearPlan 
 central_asian_legitimacy.pdf 
 chinas_central_asian_power_and_problems.pdf 
 chinese_energy_and_asian_security.pdf 
 
46 look_before_NATO_leaps_into_
the_Caspian.pdf 
030205_ce_forum01.pdf 
 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 prospects_for_chinas_influence_in_central_asia.pdf 
 shanghai_five.pdf 
 chinas_central_asian_power_and_problems.pdf 
 
47 chinas_central_asian_power_a
nd_problems.pdf 
shanghai_five.pdf 
 
48 chinas_central_asian_power_a
nd_problems.pdf 
China-UighurMuslimSeparatists-SpecialReportweb 
 
49 030205_ce_forum01.pdf 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 chinas_central_asian_power_and_problems.pdf 
 look_before_NATO_leaps_into_the_Caspian.pdf 
 
50 030205_ce_forum01.pdf look_before_NATO_leaps_into_the_Caspian.pdf 
 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 prospects_for_chinas_influence_in_central_asia.pdf 
 shanghai_five.pdf 
 chinas_central_asian_power_and_problems.pdf 
 
51 chinese_energy_and_asian_sec
urity.pdf 
prospects_for_chinas_influence_in_central_asia.pdf 
 PRCEnergyPolicyintheFive-YearPlan 
 look_before_NATO_leaps_into_the_Caspian.pdf 
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52 chinese_energy_and_asian_sec
urity.pdf 
030205_ce_forum01.pdf 
 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 prospects_for_chinas_influence_in_central_asia.pdf 
 central_asian_legitimacy.pdf 
 look_before_NATO_leaps_into_the_Caspian.pdf 
 
53 prospects_for_chinas_influenc
e_in_central_asia.pdf 
workshop_central_asia_2.pdf 
 workshop_central_asia_1.pdf 
 
54 chinese_energy_and_asian_sec
urity.pdf 
030205_ce_forum01.pdf 
 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 prospects_for_chinas_influence_in_central_asia.pdf 
 shanghai_five.pdf 
 PRCEnergyPolicyintheFive-YearPlan 
 look_before_NATO_leaps_into_the_Caspian.pdf 
 
55 workshop_central_asia_2.pdf workshop_central_asia_1.pdf 
 
56 workshop_central_asia_1.pdf workshop_central_asia_2.pdf 
 
57 workshop_central_asia_2.pdf chinese_energy_and_asian_security.pdf 
 euromoney 
 workshop_central_asia_1.pdf 
 
58 workshop_central_asia_1.pdf workshop_central_asia_2.pdf 
 PRCEnergyPolicyintheFive-YearPlan 
 
59 chinas_central_asian_power_a
nd_problems.pdf 
workshop_central_asia_2.pdf 
 workshop_central_asia_1.pdf 
 030205_ce_forum01.pdf 
 prospects_for_chinas_influence_in_central_asia.pdf 
 PRCEnergyPolicyintheFive-YearPlan 
 look_before_NATO_leaps_into_the_Caspian.pdf 
 oil_and_gas_in_Xinjiang.pdf 
 
60 workshop_central_asia_1.pdf 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 PRCEnergyPolicyintheFive-YearPlan 
 central_asian_legitimacy.pdf 
 chinese_energy_and_asian_security.pdf 
 look_before_NATO_leaps_into_the_Caspian.pdf 
 workshop_central_asia_2.pdf 
 
61 workshop_central_asia_2.pdf PRCEnergyPolicyintheFive-YearPlan 
 chinas_central_asian_power_and_problems.pdf 
 chinese_energy_and_asian_security.pdf 
 workshop_central_asia_1.pdf 
 
62 workshop_central_asia_1.pdf euromoney 
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63 workshop_central_asia_2.pdf PRCEnergyPolicyintheFive-YearPlan 
 chinas_central_asian_power_and_problems.pdf 
 chinese_energy_and_asian_security.pdf 
 workshop_central_asia_1.pdf 
 
64 euromoney 
 
65 euromoney 
 
66 workshop_central_asia_2.pdf 
 
67 workshop_central_asia_1.pdf PRCEnergyPolicyintheFive-YearPlan 
 chinese_energy_and_asian_security.pdf 
 
68 look_before_NATO_leaps_into_
the_Caspian.pdf 
030205_ce_forum01.pdf 
 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 shanghai_five.pdf 
 central_asian_legitimacy.pdf 
 workshop_central_asia_2.pdf 
69 workshop_central_asia_2.pdf 030205_ce_forum01.pdf 
 030205_ce_forum02.pdf 
 shanghai_five.pdf 
 central_asian_legitimacy.pdf 
 look_before_NATO_leaps_into_the_Caspian.pdf 
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Referenced Material (Footnote) Evaluation 
of the Case Study 
Footnote ID Source Count  Source Count 
Excluding the 
Primary Source 
29,30 exclude exclude
31 5 4
32 3 2
33 3 2
34 4 3
35 5 4
36 3 2
37 5 4
38 7 6
39 3 2
40 2 1
42 4 3
43 4 3
44 4 3
45 6 5
46 6 5
47 2 1
48 2 1
49 4 3
51 4 3
52 6 5
53 3 2
54 7 6
55 2 1
56 2 1
57 4 3
58 3 2
59 8 7
60 7 6
61 5 4
62 2 1
64 1 0
65 1 0
66 1 0
67 3 2
Information 
Verification per 
Footnote Item 
3,85 2,85
 
Note: Some footnote numbers are skipped because they repeat nearly the same 
information in another referenced item and thus are not taken into consideration in 
computing the average information verification count. 
